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ABSTRACT
CRISIS OF MEANING, CRISIS OF FORM
The purpose of my research is to investigate the relationship between crisis of meaning and crisis of form in 
art production, fruition and critique. This investigation is grounded on notions present in historic and con-
temporary nihilism, materialism and existentialism that state that a crisis inevitably occurs, through enlight-
enment, in the relationship between self-image and realist and scientific principles. 
I want to extract the word crisis from vagueness and pathology, and argue that it can serve to describe a hid-
den trinity at the centre of art – there is a crisis of meaning, a crisis of form, and a crisis in the relation be-
tween meaning and form, each time a new work is set forth.
My understanding of nihilism attempts an extraction from ethics, and puts nihilism against previous roles 
given to it. The philosophical approach present in nihilism has been used either as a byword for the enemy 
of reason, or as a dark background against which affirmation (Nietzsche), creative evolution (Bergson), or 
existentialism (Sartre) can shine. It is my purpose to explore the notion of crisis of meaning as the essence of 
nihilism (Ray Brassier), and overview its active ramifications in art.
The field of form can be seen as immanently enacting a split between project and world (Bataille) – a split 
that runs parallel to crisis of meaning in philosophy. It is central to my research to investigate the locus of this 
crisis, in its relation to contextual crises, be it personal (psychosis), political (revolution), social, and crisis in 
the very set of criteria brought about in each instance of art.
The written element will consist of twelve short chapters with as many incursions into particular instances 
where the notion of crisis of meaning is set to bring new clarity to pre-existing fields, from critical terrains to 
specific media and art history.
The practical element will deal with notions of crisis of meaning and form, as well as with personal crisis, and 
will take the form of narratives about extreme states of being and the ends of narrative (comic books). 
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Memo to myself
Write not about what you don’t understand and isn’t yours. 
Write about what you don’t understand yet can still own.
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THE CRISIS SERMON
CHAPTER ONE
O sermão há-de ter um só assunto e uma só matéria.
The sermon will have only one subject and one mat-
ter1.
Let crisis be the only sermon. Let the trinity be crisis 
of meaning, crisis of form, crisis in the relation be-
tween meaning and form.
Crisis, if understood in the ancient Greek sense, im-
mediately predates decision2. If taken as something 
in itself, something that eludes past and future, as it 
does in art, crisis is suspension, balance, reverbera-
tion and postponement ad aeternum. The work 
of art exists in the space delineated by the above-
mentioned trinity, a trinity that, like all three-legged 
chairs, is at the same time perfectly balanced yet 
prone to throw overboard those who sit down too 
heavily, too confidently. For art is resistant, and there 
are no invariants3 – art is defined against. Against cri-
tique, against that which appears, against utterance, 
even against speculation.
What is not meant by crisis? An accusation or pa-
thology. For crisis, even in ancient Greek jurispru-
dence and medicine, described not a sickness, nor 
an unsolvable conflict – on the contrary, it evoked 
openness. It is far too easy to say that the most con-
temporary thing about contemporary art is its crisis4, 
speculating over half-baked tabloid notions. It is far 
harder to grasp the variant – that element in art pro-
duction, fruition and critique that remains forever 
unsolvable.
It is impossible to know what, in the work of art, is 
intentional, because of crisis. Even if, in retrospec-
tive, retroactively, art discloses something always 
new, it is doubtful that we should or could say ‘that’s 
what it was’5 – for the storm of the present crisis 
always reinvents former crises. The storm is what 
Walter Benjamin called progress6.
1. page 186, Padre António Vieira, Sermão da Sexa-
gésima, Sermões
2. page 26, Jan Verwoert, Bas Jan Ader – In Search of 
the Miraculous
In ancient Greek jurisprudence and medicine the 
crisis is understood as the moment of decision: the 
moment (i.e. in a conflict) when the situation at hand 
is understood as too undecided and thus the crisis is 
a calling for a decision to be taken, or it is the mo-
ment when a decision is felt to be impending. So the 
state of crisis is the experience of the urgent need for 
– or of the impending arrival of – the resolution of 
an unresolved situation.
3. page 3, Theodor W Adorno, Aesthetic Theory
Art can be understood only by its laws of movement, 
not according to any set of invariants. It is defined in 
relation to what it is not.
4. page 17, Sylvère Lotringer, Paul Virilio, The Acci-
dent of Art
So don’t let anyone bug me with the crisis of con-
temporary art. The most contemporary thing about 
contemporary art is its crisis.
5. page 60, Thierry de Duve, Pictorial Nominalism – 
On Marcel Duchamp’s Passage from Painting to the 
Readymade.
It is not incorrect to say, in the manner of phenom-
enological aesthetics, that the work of art is inten-
tional, but it is an intentionality that only takes its 
meaning from a retroactive flash: ‘that’s what it was!’
6. Thesis IX page 162, Walter Benjamin, Teses sobre a 
filosofia da história
Esta tempestade é aquilo a que nós chamamos pro-
gresso.
The storm is what we call progress.
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Art is not a casualty7, but a substitution for sacrifice. 
By this it is meant: that art is not a limping character, 
but the limp itself; that war is nothing new; that post-
sacrificial societies repurpose enchantment. Art is 
not a casualty of anything other than itself, art is not 
symptomatic, it transcends guilt attribution – even 
when it reeks of guilt and shame to high heaven. Art 
is not in crisis for it is crisis itself. The word crisis 
describes better, it is argued, the nature of the artistic 
condition, than words like disaster, crime and ac-
cident. For every artwork is an instant, a suspended 
moment8 between the sacrificial scenario and the 
escape from sacrifice, between what brought about 
the making of a scene9 and the quietude expected to 
come after the scene is finished, between chaos and 
stability. 
What else is not meant by crisis? A vagueness, a 
floating signifier that absorbs at once the political, 
the psychological and the aesthetic. 
When addressing political crisis, three questions 
spring to mind. Firstly, the logic of revolution and 
the suspension of time, for in the revolutionary pro-
cess people shoot at street clocks10 and scatter legiti-
macy, which could be described as the administra-
tion of time. Secondly, the problem of crises present 
in Capitalism’s cycles comes to mind, a form of crisis 
that has been relatively controlled by constant state 
intervention11 and converted into precarious balance. 
Thirdly, there is the crisis in the political subject in 
contemporary Western democracies, a crisis that has 
to do with effacement, disempowerment, alienation, 
and a sense of antagonism become mirrored room.
7. page 17, Sylvère Lotringer, Paul Virilio, The Acci-
dent of Art
Art is the casualty of war.
8. page 7, Theodor W Adorno, Aesthetic Theory
Every artwork is an instant; every successful work 
is a cessation, a suspended moment of the process, 
as which it reveals itself to the unwavering eye. If 
artworks are answers to their own questions, they 
themselves thereby truly become questions.
9. page 26, Jan Verwoert, Bas Jan Ader – In Search of 
the Miraculous
Making a scene, in this sense, is a technique that 
preserves the ancient Greek knowledge of the impor-
tance of crisis for grasping how things develop.
10 Thesis XV, page 162 Walter Benjamin, Teses sobre 
a filosofia da história
A revolução de Julho comportou ainda um inci-
dente em que uma tal consciência pôde afirmar os 
seus direitos. Na tarde do primeiro dia de combate, 
verificou-se que em vários locais de Paris, independ-
entemente e no mesmo momento, se tinha disparado 
sobre os relógios murais.
The July revolution brought forth an event in which 
this kind of conscience could affirm it rights. On the 
afternoon of the first day of fighting, independently 
and simultaneously, people had shot at street clocks.
11 82, page 53, Guy Debord, The Society of the Spec-
tacle
Now that continual tinkering by the state has suc-
ceeded in compensating for the tendency for crises to 
occur, the same type of reasoning takes this delicate 
balance for a permanent economic harmony. 
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When addressing psychological crisis, there are im-
mense variables that come to mind, from madness to 
depression, from Crisis Houses in contemporary UK 
to the Foucauldian institutions of the past. It is pos-
sible that the single one condition with the strongest 
echo in our time is melancholia. Depression is com-
monly perceived as the limitation of possibility in the 
subject, as a dark cloud that, in a single movement, 
both limits the subject’s actions and perspectives. Yet 
it is possible to establish, if not a link, at least a paral-
lel with nihilism. It needn’t be paralysing, it can be-
come a partly active substitution or reintegration of 
life forces. Melancholia can be stoic, even if stoicism 
classically rejected melancholia as capitulation12.
When talking about aesthetic crisis, the ultra-roman-
tic Artaudian vision of Van Gogh comes to mind13, as 
does the pervasive attribute of instability that popu-
lar culture bestows on the artist. So does every other 
form of pathology-finding described above when 
addressing the so-called crisis in contemporary art.
It becomes clear that these three spheres – the politi-
cal, the psychological and the aesthetic crises – help 
to blur the term crisis, and give it an excessive qual-
ity. If one wishes to circumscribe crisis in the sphere 
of art production, fruition and critique, it is also 
necessary to accept that all generalist crises have a 
reflective presence there. By this it is meant that the 
specificity of crisis in art is its absorptive quality, and 
that the political, the psychological and the aesthetic 
have a double inside that specificity. The nature of 
this doubling will be explored in the content of this 
thesis, in its form, and in the possible connections 
between its content and its form.
12 XI, 18, page 75, Marcus Aurelius, Pensamentos
Quanto mais a atitude for impassível, mais próxima 
da força se encontrará; e, se o estar triste é sinal de 
fraqueza, também o é a cólera. Em ambos os casos, é 
ser-se ferido e capitular.
The more our attitude is untroubled, the closer to 
strength it will become; and if being sad is a sign of 
weakness, so it is with anger. In both cases, it is like 
being wounded and then capitulate.
13 page 611, Antonin Artaud, Van Gogh – The Man 
Suicided by Society (in Art in Theory 1900-2000)
Thus it wormed its way into his body,
this society
absolved,
consecrated,
sanctified
and possessed,
erased in him the supernatural consciousness he had 
just achieved, and, like an inundation of black crows 
in the fibres of his internal tree, overwhelmed him 
with one final surge, and taking its place, killed him.
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As the capitalist crisis cycles have been muted by a 
tinkering of the state, so has our post-sacrificial soci-
ety begun to administer violence and its overproduc-
tion through the judiciary, the presence of the police 
and the primacy of the law in everyday life. One can 
say that crisis, law and sacrifice are thus everywhere. 
Through enlightenment, sacrifice is sacrificed per-
manently, without interruption, in an introverted 
movement14; crisis becomes critique – and critique 
is also everywhere. When speaking of art, crisis can 
be said to be its precondition, not in a clinical sense, 
but in a matter of fact way. For each new work opens 
up a new set of paradigms of interpolation, a new ob-
scurity (for art can never be fully disenchanted) and 
a new light (for art always brings forth the promise 
of revelation or at least the weak form of revelation 
which is reward).
Artworks delay. What they delay is the subject of cri-
sis, its melodrama, its setting and its function. Crisis 
is a moment of suspension before resolution, out-
come, decision. Art never leaves this moment, for, in 
leaving this moment, art is in tune with that which is 
not art, and ceases to exist. If we were to believe that 
all artworks die, as Duchamp believed15, we could still 
keep our argument of and for crisis. If art achieves 
a resolution or projects a retroactive flash, it is no 
longer itself. This is not to say that art lacks empa-
thetic qualities – on the contrary, empathy functions, 
but it functions in the dark as to how it functions.
Art is of the moment, of interruption – art is disjoint-
ed crisis. If this was somehow latent in Duchamp and 
evident in Greenberg and Adorno16, it never ceased 
to be actual – what is postulated here is the contem-
porary condition of this moment that crisis both 
circumscribes and opens. It can be argued that the 
word crisis needs to be rescued from vagueness and 
pathology – that it describes the new and it describes 
art, for art is always on the side of the new.
14 page 37, Theodor W Adorno, Horkheimer, quoted 
in Ray Brassier’s Nihil Unbound
The history of civilization is the history of the intro-
version of sacrifice – in other words, the history of 
renunciation
15 page 67, Marcel Duchamp, Pierre Cabanne, Dia-
logues with Marcel Duchamp
I think painting dies, you understand? After forty or 
fifty years a picture dies, because its freshness dis-
appears. Sculpture also dies. […] Men are mortal, 
pictures too.
16 Instances of contemporary art seen as transitory, 
question and refusal appear in Adorno’s Aesthetic 
Theory: 
Art’s substance could be its transitoriness. (page 4)
Every artwork is an instant; every successful work 
is a cessation, a suspended moment of the process, 
as which it reveals itself to the unwavering eye. If 
artworks are answers to their own questions, they 
themselves thereby truly become questions. (page 7)
[…] Through the new, critique – the refusal – be-
comes an objective element of art itself. (page 29)
Instances of modern art seen as in perpetual move-
ment appear in Clement Greenberg’s Avant-garde 
and Kitsch 1939, Collected Writings, vol. I
That avant-garde culture is the imitation of imitating 
– the fact itself – calls neither approval nor disap-
proval. […] The avant-garde moves, while Alexandri-
anism stands still.
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We can now go back to the beginning, and analyse if 
any light has entered the trinities.
What is meant by crisis of meaning is a non-patho-
logical and precise condition in which art ceases to 
function as self-image and refuses disentanglement 
and clarity.
What is meant by crisis of form is of no relation to 
the question of immaterial labour, but instead draws 
something from the question of how to begin a work 
(instead of how to finish it).
What is meant by crisis in the relation between 
meaning and form is that all intelligibility lands not 
on meaning nor on form, but on the shifting sands 
between them.
As regards the second trinity, which describes three 
contextual crises, it is possible to ascertain that it 
exists as a double inside crisis in art. Crisis is suspen-
sion, and this suspension that forever eludes decision 
can be said to be absorptive.
Crisis will be the only sermon, yet this sermon, like 
Vieira’s, will try to remain true to the form of crisis, 
and accept digression, aphorisms, re-enterings and 
excursions.
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Notes to chapter one:
Crisis of meaning is nihilism, or psychosis, crisis of 
form is the blind search for a truth, for in form there 
is always Platonic truth. Yet the search itself is blind, 
hence our modern distaste for truth.
In high modernism, form was meaning, and mean-
ing form17. Crisis brought the two to a curious ar-
rangement, the details of which are yet to be under-
stood. When they are understood, another crisis will 
erupt, and the previous crisis will become solid.
Crisis is the way of making the ruin. The ruin is all 
we can bear to see.
Truth is on the side of the unformed and truth is on 
the side of death18. One must write either for dead 
people or for the unborn. One must write in death.
Some of us live in perpetual crisis. This doesn’t inca-
pacitate us. It is a noisy background for purposeful 
action. It is a norm beyond norm.
17 page 8, Clement Greenberg’s Avant-garde and 
Kitsch 1939, Collected Writings, vol. I
Content is to be dissolved so completely into form 
that the work of art or literature cannot be reduced in 
whole or in part to anything other than itself.
18 page 11, Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace
To love truth means to endure the void and, as a re-
sult, to accept death. Truth is on the side of death.
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MEANINGLESS
CHAPTER TWO
Meaningless?
You mean it’s all been meaningless?
Every whisper and caress?
Yes yes yes it was totally meaningless1
When the fever hits on your forehead
And trusive mice chew up your bed
And you call on God and God is dead
Love comes to you2
How does nihilism equate with the problems specific 
to art production, fruition and critique?
In order to answer this question I will first engage 
with the concept of nihilism, and try to extract a 
sense of purposefulness from this overexposed term. 
In popular culture, the nihilistic standpoint – that 
all things are meaningless – is commonly perceived 
in a dual relation to nature and culture, and it stands 
as tabooed truth – a truth too corrosive to be part 
of human exchange. In its relation to nature, nihil-
ism determines abandonment3, recreation4 or utter 
passivity. In its relation to culture, nihilism is seen as 
triggering numbness, wit and suicide, or inversely, as 
symptom stemming from these actions or states of 
being. Again, we find a rush to determine patholo-
gies where perhaps none exist for, even if the mass 
murderer appears nihilistic, it is perhaps only be-
cause he embodies our bad conscience about what to 
do with the overproduction of violence, now that we 
have abandoned all openly sacrificial modes of life5 
(the realization of the implications of this abandon-
ment of sacrifice stems from my readings of René 
Girard and are developed further in chapter four – 
Bad Manners).
1 Magnetic Fields 1999
2 Bonnie ‘Prince’ Billy 2006
3 page 25, Sade, Diálogo entre um padre e um mori-
bundo 1782
Só me cumpro pelo abandono.
The only I can fulfil myself is through abandonment
4 Sade, Panegírico fúnebre de Marat e Le Pelletier 
1793
See the notion of revolution recreating nature that is 
the main theme of this text.
5 pages 85-86, René Girard, Violence and the Sacred
Our rationalist bent […] leads to an innocence of 
outlook that refuses to concede to collective violence 
anything more than a limited and fleeting influence, 
a ‘cathartic’ action […].
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Nihilism is seen as pathology not only in popu-
lar culture, but in psychology, philosophy, art. The 
depressed person is deemed to stand too close to 
the truth, the nihilistic philosopher is judged as 
a threat to the survival of hope and articulation, 
and the nothing artist is brushed aside as being too 
existential. Yet if it might be true that one cannot 
dance without hope, it is even truer that one can float 
better without it, as Karen Blixen once wrote6. Nihil-
ism needs to be extracted from pathology, and given 
the chance to be considered a plain prerequisite for 
intellectual maturity and honesty. Nihilism will not 
lead us into crime and sin; nihilism is purification7 
against cheap consolation; nihilism does not pre-
suppose the destruction of all societal and cultural 
constructions (how could a system that knows itself 
to be a construction advocate the abolishment of all 
construction?); nihilism is the historical and contem-
porary assertion that there are two crises associated 
with meaning – one external and one internal. The 
external crisis in meaning has to do with historical 
nihilism, and the internal crisis in meaning is a more 
contemporary affair8 – meaning has become itself 
a centre focus of philosophical enquiry. For what 
is meaning, and how do we attribute it to an object 
or process? The difficulty resides in meaning’s dual 
nature – meaning is at once circumscription and 
movement beyond itself – meaning is at once to and 
fro. Meaning has become obscure, enigmatic, deeply 
elusive, in a form of internal crisis.
6 page 11, Karen Blixen, The Diver, Anecdotes of 
Destiny
For without hope one cannot dance. […] Our experi-
ence has proven to us, as your own will some time do 
it to you, that one may quite well float without hope, 
that one will even float better without it.
7 page 115, Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace
Atheism is purification
8 Ray Brassier, Interviewed by Marcin Rychte
Very simply, nihilism is a crisis of meaning. This 
crisis is historically conditioned, because what we 
understand by ‘meaning’ is historically conditioned. 
We’ve moved from a situation in which the phenom-
enon of ‘meaning’ was self-evident to one in which 
it has become an enigma, and a primary focus of 
philosophical investigation.
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Externally, meaning is in crisis also in two ways – 
there is a crisis in human beings’ place in the uni-
verse – a crisis usually associated with enlightenment 
and suspicion (with Copernicus, Darwin, Marx and 
Freud as the cardinal suspects), but there is also 
a crisis in the image produced by philosophy and 
common sense in the image of man as intentional 
creature. The crisis associated with the universal will 
probably continue for as long as man is conscious of 
the inevitability of extinction and the void that pre-
dated what was once called creation – no matter how 
banal we deem this to be, brushing all postmodernist 
ideas to the back of our minds. The crisis associated 
with man’s image of himself as an intentional being 
has become clearer only recently, and is sometimes 
put clumsily in association with the advent of con-
nectionist neuroscience and the fiction that accom-
panies it.
Internally, meaning is also in crisis due to the shifting 
sands of context and definition. By context I mean 
those things that usually scaffold meaning, and that 
are made fragile as constructions and superstruc-
tures. By definition I mean the problems associated 
with legitimacy, intentionality and consciousness. We 
can see that there is a strong link between the crises 
that are external to meaning, and those which are 
integral to it.
It can be argued that all these crises have become the 
substance and the form of art. The crises in man’s 
image of himself as man in the world and as inten-
tional creature have a double inside crisis in art, for 
from art we always expect, if not a reflective surface, 
at least refraction, revelation, reward. The crisis of 
meaning that nihilism articulates is manifested in art 
through a doubling, then. Maybe this will become 
clearer if we choose a circumscribed subject inside 
the sphere of art, one that epitomises blankness and 
meaninglessness.
15
An overview of the history of monochromes in 
painting could give us a glimpse as to where the rela-
tionship between art and nihilism lies. Monochromes 
appeared in moments of the avant-garde when nihil-
istic concerns were at the forefront, not in the sense 
that meaninglessness was sought, but in the sense 
that meaningless was found. In revolutionary Rus-
sia, monochromes can be seen as icons in reverse. In 
Malevich’s own words, the Black Square was a royal 
infant9, and here we can see a mirroring of Orthodox 
aesthetics and ethics of presentation. We can see that 
what was in process was not a substitution, but a re-
versal and an erasure. Monochromes, in Russia, can 
be seen as the back of the sacred image – they can 
also be seen as censorship and iconoclasm in the true 
sense of the word, but what seems most pertinent is 
the notion of monochromes as extinction of images. 
In this latter sense, monochromes predict the extinc-
tion of all images, and through a subtractive opera-
tion they run parallel with nihilistic denial, oblit-
eration, and above all, affirmation. Monochromes 
– whenever they are relevant and timely – reappear 
as emblems of suspicion and inadequacy of all cul-
tural self-representations of the human.
Monochromes are very close to theism and atheism 
(in heaven, the two are often confused), hence they 
are close to the idea of God. They do not answer 
back, their language is that of flat transcendence, a 
transcendence that is both completely material and 
completely abstract. In this sense, monochrome 
paintings can be deeply ambivalent, with the kind 
of ambivalence described by Marx when writing on 
commodity fetishism10. Monochromes can be all 
about the material qualities of the surface (Ad Rein-
hardt), they can be about the absolutely transcendent 
(Rothko), or about rupture and liberation (Oiticica). 
 
9 Malevich, Collected Writings
10 On Karl Marx’s view on commodity fetishism and 
ambiguity, see Capital:
Therefore they only appear as commodities, or have 
the form of commodities, in so far as they possess a 
double form, i.e. natural form and value form. (page 
138)
The riddle of the money fetish is therefore the rid-
dle of the commodity fetish, now become visible and 
dazzling to our eyes. (page 187)  
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Through this elusive nature, monochromes are at 
once the most immediately commodifiable and the 
most radical of artistic gestures. They bear a relation-
ship to what the grid meant for Rosalind Krauss or 
abstraction for Adorno. In Adorno, we can also find 
a warning against the threat of harmlessness, which 
is the threat of the monochrome.
As with the monochrome, so can nihilism fluctuate 
seamlessly between threat and sleep of reason, for 
nihilism is often perceived as: an idle giving up on 
meaning; a complete and rigorous effort to absorb 
crisis of meaning into intellectual life; a potent threat 
to human psyche, thought and action.
It is perhaps not a coincidence that, after producing 
colourful monochromes, Rodchenko advocated a 
giving up on art, and a collective move on the part 
of artists towards the graphic arts and architecture – 
the narrative arts and the stable arts. Monochromes 
are final gestures, endgames, a sign of the perishable 
nature of all images, and an opening up of art to the 
void beneath it. It seems natural that, for Rodchenko, 
monochromes represented at the same time a jump-
ing off point, a suicide of art, and an affirmation of 
concept, colour and the matter of life. Nihilism can 
serve as the background for these kinds of affirmative 
stances, be it in Nietzsche or Sartre – an affirmation 
of life against a sullen colour, a crisis of meaning. 
17
We can now venture back to our question. How does 
crisis as present in nihilism relate to the crisis specific 
to art production, fruition and critique? Art adheres 
to a moment that is always in the passing – through 
crisis, it predates decision. Monochromes predate the 
image. Art cannot help but to confront the limits of 
meaning and form, and the elusive nature in the trin-
ity of crises embedded within them. Monochromes 
confront extinction, be it with a depressed, quasi-
religious bowing down, or with a vital surge. Art is 
not the production of meaning, but a rearrangement 
of the structures that cannot help but to obstruct 
meaning – these structures are at once art historical, 
speculative and, yes, formal. Monochromes confront 
the extinction of images. Monochromes are poor, 
they stand in for the image.
According to Nietzsche, there were eternities during 
which the human intellect did not exist. And when 
it is all over with the human intellect, nothing will 
have happened11. The fact that nothing will have hap-
pened seems particularly pertinent to a philosophy 
concerned with truth and its own ending. Again, 
Nietzsche points out that the living creature is sim-
ply a kind of dead creature, only a very rare kind. 
All is death, and life is merely a rare kind of death. 
Nihilism does not completely overcome transcend-
ence, but bypasses it, renders it archaic, transfigures 
it. Thought becomes detached from knowing11 for 
truth is too terrible, too sublime for immediate and 
engaged understanding. Truth acts, thus, in a man-
ner against itself, and the philosophical will to truth 
mirrors the mysterious will to nothingness. Also in 
Nietzsche, Christian dolorism and stoic endurance 
find a continuation12, in the praise of resilience to 
suffering.
11 page 205, Nietzsche, quoted in Brassier, Ray, Nihil 
Unbound – Enlightenment and Extinction 
There were eternities during which [the human intel-
lect] did not exist. And when it is all over with the 
human intellect, nothing will have happened.
12 page 212, Brassier, Ray, Nihil Unbound – Enlight-
enment and Extinction ‘[…] The affirmation of re-
currence is the moment when finite lunar joy eclipses 
boundless solar pain’. ‘Either one ascribes a redemp-
tive function to suffering itself, as does Christian 
dolorism, or one reintroduces a spiritual economy of 
means and ends […]’
18
Art has to confront extinction in each instance of its 
production, both in terms of its means and its ends. 
Universal extinction seems to relate to art’s preoccu-
pation with the end of culture as such, and the means 
through which culture can or cannot validate its ex-
istence. The prospect of extinction does not necessar-
ily lead to morose purposelessness but, for example 
in Nietzsche, it can lead even to Dionysian dance.
Monochromes are, for instance, concerned with that 
extinction which follows the image in cultural and 
material form. Monochromes are already extinct, 
both as cultural affirmation and as a prediction of the 
death of all intellectual life.
The first recorded monochrome can be said to have 
appeared in 1759, in Tristam Shandy, as a black page 
that interrupts the book. It happened in the context 
of illustration, as an etching plate without image. The 
monochrome in Sterne’s book served as a page of 
mourning for a lost character, and it has sometimes 
been seen as a funereal page, a tombstone. It is my 
contention that it represents nothingness, and in-
augurates a moment of extinction – extinction of lan-
guage and extinction of form. The black page is at a 
loss. It is also hilarious, and this hilariousness makes 
it confront nihilism and the void with the wisest of 
tools.
Notes to chapter 2:
If monochromes represent anything, they represent 
this: the sacrifice and recuperation of images.
Aphorisms are suicide notes without a suicide to re-
fer to. Nihilism isn’t suicidal – suicide is imaginary13, 
nihilism tries to handle burning truths beyond the 
imaginary.
The monochrome is the purest confrontation be-
tween art and that which is not art. It is the simplest 
form of dialectics.
13 page 225, Lyotard quoted in Brassier, Ray, Nihil 
Unbound – Enlightenment and Extinction 
But the death of the sun is a death of mind, because it 
is the death of death as the life of the mind.
see also page 8, Lyotard, The Inhuman
But that ‘s not he question. While we talk, the sun is 
getting older. It will explode in 4.5 billion years. It’s 
just a little beyond the halfway point of its expected 
lifetime. It’s like a man in his early forties with a life 
expectancy of eighty. With the sun’s death your in-
soluble questions will be done with too.
19
Voltaire said that God is a comedian playing to an 
audience too afraid to laugh. I guess that God does 
sign all his letters with an LOL. The terrified receiv-
ers don’t know if he is laughing out loud or sending 
his only asset, lots of love. Either way and other than 
that, the letters are blank.
Come down from the cloud of unknowing and take a 
look at this crap.
Lust then dust.
20
GIVE THAT OLD TIME RELIGION
CHAPTER THREE
Lacking any form of liturgy, people were already 
moving in a vast slaughterhouse1.
During the Great War, Wittgenstein saw consecrated 
bread being transported in chromium steel boxes. 
This struck him as ludicrous. In the midst of sacrifi-
cial crisis – where millions were being massacred for 
no apparent reason – this old, archaic form of sacri-
fice struck him as ludicrous, for indeed it was, and 
indeed it is. There is nothing more intolerable than 
sacrifice in an age that denies it2, for we can, in sacri-
fice, have a clear reflection of the ludicrous, tabooed 
lengths that men go to in order to contain violence 
inside the sacred.
The magic bread inside chromium steel is profoundly 
sad, a bit like a child being told by an older friend 
about what really goes on during Christmas eve.
1 page 9, Roberto Calasso, The Ruin of Kasch
Lacking any form of liturgy, people were already 
moving in a vast slaughterhouse.
2 page 18, Roberto Calasso, The Ruin of Kasch
But nothing is more intolerable than sacrifice in an 
age that denies it […].
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Lacking liturgy, we move in a vast slaughterhouse. 
The contemporary state has ways of soothing this 
– war happens in crisis countries far away, slaughter-
houses are unidentifiable and nondescript even more 
so than factories, and the administration of violence 
becomes one of our largest enigmas. The machiner-
ies of war, slaughter and violence disappear from 
sight3. Through the military, the apparatus of animal 
production and through the judiciary, vengeance 
and violence – like sacrificial logic before them – are 
concealed. For sacrifice was never explainable for 
those involved in it as celebrants or devotees4 – or 
the explanations were too varied and secret for us 
to make a general sense from these voices. Yet one 
recurring theme is that of creation as God’s ampu-
tated limb5 – sacrificial logic re-enacts the binary act 
of destruction and birth involved in these narratives 
of creation, in a ceremony that not only returns to 
God what is God’s, but does so through mimicking 
God himself. We can view this mimicking act as: a 
secret overthrowing of the God6; a polarity that ends 
up separating the eternal being from the bloody mess 
down here7; a powerful manifestation that involves 
not the expiation of guilt, but guilt itself8.
Not only does the sacred contain violence, but 
violence seeks containment in the sacred9. Yet if the 
bond between violence and the sacred is structural, 
as Girard argues extensively, what happens now, that 
these are decomposed or weakened? What happened 
to sacrifice? Should we believe Adorno, when he 
wrote that the history of civilization is the history 
of the progressive introspection of sacrifice10? And, 
more importantly for our concerns, what does art 
have to do with that obscured and archaic sacrificial 
logic?
3 page 28, Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred
As soon as the judicial system gains supremacy, its 
machinery disappears from sight. Like sacrifice, it 
conceals – even as it also reveals – its resemblance to 
vengeance, differing only in that it is not self-perpet-
uating and its decisions discourage reprisals.
4 page 7, Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred
[…] The sacrificial process requires a certain degree 
of misunderstanding. The celebrants do not and must 
not comprehend the true role of the sacrificial act.
5 page 135, Roberto Calasso, The Ruin of Kasch
The Creation is the body of the first victim. In the 
Creation the divinity amputates and forsakes a part 
of itself. Thereafter the divinity can only observe the 
amputated limb in the hands of necessity.
6 page 49, T W Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dia-
lectic of Enlightenment
If barter is the secular form of sacrifice, the latter 
appears as the magical pattern of rational exchange, 
a device of men by which the gods may be mastered: 
the gods are overthrown by the very system by which 
they are honored.
7 page 146, Walter Burkert, Religião grega na época 
clássica e arcaica
Em relação ao deus o sacrifício encontra-se numa 
situação de polaridade: por meio da morte que 
inflige, ele confirma a contrario o poder superior do 
deus, completamente diferente, imortal, ‘ente eterno’. 
In relation to the god, sacrifice is placed in a posi-
tion of polarity. Through the death that it inflicts, it 
confirms a contrario the superior power of the god as 
completely different, immortal, eternal being’.
8 page 134, Roberto Calasso, The Ruin of Kasch
Sacrifice does not expiate guilt, as the textbooks say. 
Sacrifice is guilt.
9 page 25, Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred
Religion shelters us from violence just as violence 
seeks shelter in religion.
10 page 37, Theodor W Adorno, Horkheimer, quoted 
in Ray Brassier’s Nihil Unbound
The history of civilization is the history of the intro-
version of sacrifice – in other words, the history of 
renunciation 22
Art can be seen as an escape from sacrifice11 – but 
if sacrifice is now almost fully introverted, where 
does that escape take place? It can be argued that, 
in romanticism, that problematic reached a kind of 
deadlock, a deadlock that has deeply marked our 
idea of what an artist is.  That idea, no matter how 
many times it has been refuted and battled against, is 
still there, running wild in popular imagination and 
hovering like a ghost over every artist’s studio, gallery 
and critic’s pen.
We can say that romanticism is the tangible proof 
that sacrifice has indeed been turned outside in, it 
has suffered a powerful process of introversion.  The 
romantic artist is indeed the sacrificial victim who, 
escaping the verdict of annihilation, ventures into 
the woods and confronts nature for the first time – a 
nature that has always known sacrifice – for it main-
tains itself through its own destruction12 but now 
more keenly so, by human hand, through industry. 
Witnessing disaster, the romantic artist invites sacri-
fice back to a new home – that which the artist calls 
his heart. The altar may be bare, but sacrifice is still 
going ahead, according to plan, in the recesses of the 
romantic soul. 
How does the romantic artist find his balance amid 
this sort of sacrificial crisis? Like Duchamp or Ki-
erkegaard’s Abraham13: being an individual14. The 
faithless Duchamp and Kierkegaard’s Abraham have 
this in common – they are absolutely nothing but the 
individual, without connections or complications. 
They maintain an economy of crisis and they are 
prepared to let go – abandoning painting or a much-
loved son – through the introversion of sacrifice.
11 page 161, Roberto Calasso, The Ruin of Kasch
In art speaks the voice of the victim who, in extremis and 
forever after, has escaped being killed, when ritual had 
already channeled all sacrality back into that killing.
Art has a light step because it wanders in the forest. The 
altar is now bare.
12 page 18, Fernando Pessoa, Alexander Search, Um jan-
tar muito especial
Dela [da gastronomia] poderia dizer o que Schopenhauer 
diz do mundo, que se mantém pela sua própria destru-
ição.
Of gastronomy he could say what Schopenhauer argues 
about the world – that it maintains itself through its own 
destruction.
13 page 56, Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling
He will never forget that, in one hundred and thirty years, 
you got no further than faith. 
14 page 21, António Olaio, Ser um indivíduo chez Marcel 
Duchamp.
Coincidindo, em Duchamp, a noção de artista com a 
fruição de ser um indivíduo, ser um artista é mais do que 
ter a faculdade de criar obras de arte: é ter a capacidade 
de, através delas, intuir a dinâmica do que é existir.
In Duchamp we find that the notion of artist and the frui-
tion involved in being an individual coincide, so being an 
artist amounts to more than having the faculty of creating 
artworks: rather, through the creation of these, the artist 
intuits the dynamics of what it is to exist.
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With the advent of modernity sacrifice becomes 
even more corrosive and even more introverted – 
the ultimate sacrifice becomes that of subjectivity15. 
By focusing on a world that excludes the subject, 
the modern artist, like Manet or Cézanne, sacrifices 
integral subjectivity in the pursuit of objecthood. It’s 
not only subjectivity that is sacrificed, but the very 
image of sacrifice itself. The very cliché about all the 
necessary, little sacrifices, seems to hold true. Indeed 
we have nothing but little sacrifices. Contemporary, 
immaterial practices thus seem the natural continu-
ation of the introversion of sacrifice. Even the sacri-
fice of subjectivity is sacrificeable. Even form. Even 
objecthood.
Now we can go back to those immense questions.  
Where is violence and where is the sacred? Where is 
their bond in sacrifice?
Maybe we can go back to that host inside steel. In 
Christ we can see a powerful shift in the role of 
sacrifice, and the beginning of what is still our pro-
cess, which is the process of civilization, and with 
what Adorno called the introversion of sacrifice and 
renunciation. Christ is the last victim16, a sacrifice to 
end all sacrifices, a God that lays himself down upon 
the altar to be slain. We are already miles apart from 
the classic sacrificial logic where one of the elements 
was that the victim is already slain by God17 even be-
fore the sacrificial act, for it is mortal. Christ is God 
himself, he is immortal, so his sacrifice destroys the 
whole logic of externalized sacrifice.
After his death comes the host, and the re-enactment 
of that ultimate sacrifice on a daily basis. Violence is 
contained in an internalized way, violence is perma-
nently remembered. One can say that this strange 
form of sacrifice, the eucharist, is a weak form of sac-
rifice that needs and is contemporary with the rise of 
roman law. Its preventive18 force is weakened because 
there is no communal shedding of blood, therefore it 
is privatized sacrifice.
Christianity seems indeed like a religion that bears in 
itself, from the outset, the seeds of its own privatiza-
tion.
15 page 77-78, Thierry de Duve, Pictorial Nominal-
ism
[…] I agree to sacrifice my subjective unity and allow 
the plural significance of my self-image to appear, but 
to the benefit of an unalterable pseudo-object, the 
self-sufficient epiphany of a world that excludes me.
16 page 169, Roberto Calasso, The Ruin of Kasch
The extinction of sacrifice. The victim gradually loses 
its power. We become detached from the animal – it 
is no longer considered so close to us that it can be 
substituted for us. Humans, now protected by the 
law, are rejected as victims. Thus, the last victim will 
be a god condemned by the law.
17 XI, 33, Bhagavad-Gita
And so arise, win glory,
Conquer thine enemies and enjoy a prosperous king-
dom.
Long since have these men in truth been slain by Me,
Thine it is only the mere occasion.
18 page 19, Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred
In primitive societies the risk of unleashed violence is 
so great and the cure so problematic that the em-
phasis naturally falls on prevention. The preventive 
measures naturally fall within the domain of religion, 
where they can on occasion assume a violent charac-
ter. Violence and the sacred are inseparable.
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What is the contemporary condition of the subject’s 
relation to the law, now that sacrifice has been duly 
privatized? Can the law truly be seen as a blind lady 
with benign intentions, to meet in special occasions? 
Through Kafka we learn that, no, that law is, on 
the contrary, a perversion of sacrifice, it is sacrifice 
abstracted. Of course Joseph K is under arrest, but 
that doesn’t prevent him from going to work and 
lead a normal life19. K is the sacrificial lamb and the 
surrogate victim of our time – through him we learn 
what the law really means, and circumvent the taboo. 
The law is the administration of vengeance in a way 
that covers its tracks, through the taboo composed 
of trust in justice and belief in society. K is no Christ, 
but more like a Cain before the crime, his primal 
curse is not having a sacrificial outlet20. Violence 
becomes immaterial and abstract, and will choose 
a random victim, an interchangeable victim, like it 
always does. K embodies what it means to be eman-
cipated from ritual21.
We need to go back to art one more time, in order to 
escape this nightmare. For art manages to be heard, 
and violence is the condition of that which isn’t 
heard22. Art knows that there is no origin for beauty 
but the wound23, even if it is an immaterial wound, 
even if it just the curse of being able to think. The 
problem with modernity is that we have been left 
bereft of a belief in a defining narrative of our condi-
tion, civilization, and culture24 – the good news is 
that the belief has only shifted places, it now persists 
in what can be called weak contracts of faith. Art is 
one of these contracts.
19 page 18. Franz Kafka, O Processo
Com certeza que está preso, mas isso não impede que 
vá ao seu trabalho nem que faça a sua vida normal.
Of course you are under arrest, but that doesn’t pre-
vent you from going to work and lead a normal life.
20 page 4, Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred
Cain’s ‘jealousy’ of his brother is only another term 
for his one characteristic trait: his lack of a sacrificial 
outlet.
21 page 88, Walter Benjamin, A obra de arte na era 
da sua reprotutibilidade técnica. 
[…] A reprodutibilidade técnica da obra de arte 
emancipa-a, pela primeira vez na história do mundo, 
da sua existência parasitária no ritual.
The work of art’s technical reproducibility emanci-
pates it, for the first time in the history of the world, 
from its parasitic existence in ritual.
22 page 152, Roberto Calasso, La Letteratura e gli Dèi
Violento è innanzitutto ciò che non ha trovatto as-
colto.
Violent is the status of that which hasn’t found a 
listening party.
23 page 307, Jean Genet, quoted in Miguel Ángel 
Ramos, Quizá la distancia sea duda, Estratágias del 
dibujo contemporáneo
No hay para la belleza más origen que la herida.
There is no other origin for beauty but the wound.
24 page 124, Arthur C. Danto, Shapes of Artistic 
Past, East and West, Beyond the Brillo Box
I think that modernity begins with the loss of belief 
in the defining narrative of one’s own culture.
23
Notes to chapter 3:
Art is religion without protocol. Protocol without 
religion is Kafka.
Christ didn’t pray for the world, Weil noted25. Saint 
Paul helped us forget that basic trait.
Religious art is no longer possible, yet all new art 
proposes a weak contract of faith. Religious art is the 
only one possible.
God is a promise we make ourselves of being better 
than we already are.
Religion is circumscribed, but there is no outside to 
faith. For faith is a tiny spec, a nothing that lingers.
What a terrible image, the all-seeing eye of God, 
what a neurotic construction. I much prefer the 
seeing ear in Paul Claudel’s Psalm – Il n’y a que ton 
oreille qui soit capable de me regarder26. 
25 page 165, Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace
Christ redeemed the vegetative, not the social. He did 
not pray for the world.
26 Paul Claudel, Psaumes
Il n’y a que ton Oreille qui soit capable de me re-
garder.
Only your ear is capable of watching me.
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BAD MANNERS
CHAPTER FOUR
They are coming to teach us good manners but won’t 
succeed, because we are gods1.
We are still soiled and darkened2 by sacrificial men-
tality, even in an age where sacrifice has lost articula-
tion. To prove this point one needs to look no further 
than the common glossary attached to terrorism. 
Suicide bomber, we say. We say suicide, then bomber. 
This is because we still believe in the narrative of 
martyrdom, in its clauses close to spiritual blackmail, 
in its sacrificial logic. For suicide is but a detail, and 
a vaporous one – the mass murderer knows he needs 
it to be ‘lucky like Saint Sebastian’3 (and lucky here 
means to have a martyr’s glorious exit), and to prove 
his point, all the while condemning the victims and 
survivors to silence. The killer who immolates him-
self in or after the act of killing knows full well that 
we still respect heroes, even though we know that 
these are no longer possible. We have all become 
Sebastianists, not in the martyr’s sense, but in the 
Portuguese mythology around the young dead king. 
Sebastião trapped the Portuguese imagination, even 
though – or because – he lead his country into ruin, 
Spanish invasion, dissolution, while dying in the 
process. As long as you die in the midst of the horror 
that you yourself have created, you escape clear judg-
ment, accountability, sanity. You enter the sacrificial 
domain and can spiritually blackmail a whole nation, 
a whole world. For the world expects the return of 
the hero, it expects El Rei Dom Sebastião to come 
and deliver his people from the real. In this sense, 
each time we say suicide bomber we are partaking in 
an obscene religion, which is that of sacrifice. 
1 page 136, Giuseppe Tommaso di Lampedusa, O 
Leopardo
2 page 205, René Girard, Things Hidden Since the 
Foundation of the World, 
If we can rid ourselves of the vestiges of the sacrificial 
mentality that soil and darken the recesses of our 
minds, we shall see that we now have all the elements 
at hand for understanding that the death of Jesus 
takes place for reasons that have nothing to do with 
sacrifice.
3 Momus, Lucky Like Saint Sebastian, Circus Maxi-
mus. 
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It is under this light that we can look at Karlheinz 
Stockhausen’s excitement about September 114. 
‘What happened there is, of course – now all of you 
must adjust your brains – the biggest work of art 
that has ever been’. His arousal at the televised sight 
of mass murder is explained very bluntly by sacrifi-
cial logic and Sebastianism. If the killers hadn’t died 
in the process, there would have been no Stock-
hausen press conference. Terrorism has very little 
in common with art, for art seems indeed to be the 
semblance of what is beyond death’s reach5 – art is 
guided by a faith that there will be a – momentary 
– solution, and that in the end things will be better6. 
The contract of faith that art establishes is subtle, ob-
scure as to how it operates, yet is akin to friendship. 
The spiritual blackmail that terrorism engages with is 
also obscure as to how it operates, and its blackmail 
stems from sacrificial logic.
One could say that, through obscurity and the sub-
lime, terrorism mimics art, and never the other way 
around.
‘Every work of art is an uncommitted crime’7, Ador-
no wrote. Its uncommitted, undetermined nature 
is mimicked by contemporary terrorism through 
the destruction of the perpetrator, who is willing to 
engage himself, and engage us, in sacrificial logic and 
in the sacrificial knot.
To expose the fallacy of this logic is to go beyond vio-
lence and into the domain of the weak. In this sense, 
the destiny of Christianity has always been to end 
sacrificial logic, to end a strong sense of the sacred, to 
end a strong sense of what religion is and should be. 
The Judeo-Christian narrative is one of progressive 
destitution of the sacrificial logic. God progressively 
lets go of sacrificial logic and learns to do without it, 
in alliance with the human counterpart. The stories 
of Abel, Abraham, Job and Christ, if put together 
and sequentially, should be enough to elucidate this 
point. 
4 Stockhausen, quoted in
page 29, Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, Heroes – mass murder 
and suicide.
5 page 35. Theodor W Adorno, Aesthetic Theory
6 page 20, Jean-François Lyotard, The inhuman
That’s the hope sustaining all writing (painting, etc): 
that in the end, things will be better. As there is no 
end, this hope is illusory.
7 page 111, Theodor W Adorno, Minima Moralia
Every work of art is an uncommitted crime.
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The return of a strong sense of faith is but the curtain 
that prevents us from seeing a possible future, one in 
which religion can be fully privatized, and the Gos-
pels can become a form of honeymoon once again8. 
This is not to say that Christianity is the global an-
swer, but precisely the opposite – Christianity should 
be the first to acknowledge the fallibility of all global, 
conquering answers, and settle on the side of weak-
ness.
We are in what Girard would call a sacrificial crisis9, 
our age is one where we can no longer tell the differ-
ence between purifying violence (sacrificial in es-
sence) and contagious, impure violence (sacrificial in 
appearance).
Girard presents us two avenues, two possible answers 
to sacrificial crisis – one pragmatic (acceptance of 
sacrificial logic), the other radical (transcendence 
of sacrificial logic through Christ’s example). René 
Girard posits that ‘the best men can hope for in their 
quest for nonviolence is the unanimity-minus-one 
of the surrogate victim’10, and presents religions as 
inherently pragmatic systems of containing violence 
inside the sacred. What is meant by Girard is that 
the universality of sacrificial acts reveals an anthro-
pological function that has practical ends. On the 
other hand, when asked to elaborate on the Christian 
meaning for sacrifice the author argues that there is 
none, and that Christ’s death was non-sacificial11. For 
Girard, the essence of the gospels is the essence of 
Christianity – and this essence can be boiled down to 
an announcement of the Kingdom. Christ’s role is to 
teach whoever wishes to listen on how to transcend 
both sacrificial logic and reciprocal violence. Access-
ing God directly – in secret – transcends the need for 
collective murder; giving the other cheek bypasses 
the participation in the contamination associated 
with violence. 
8 page 235-6, René Girard, Things Hidden Since the 
Foundation of the World
People who believe that they can defend transcend-
ence while retaining sacrifice are misguided in my 
opinion. The sacrificial definition, which has always 
been sedulously preserved by anti-Christian crit-
ics, facilitates today’s atheism and all the talk about 
the death of God. What is in fact finally dying is the 
sacrificial concept of divinity preserved by medi-
eval and modern theology – not the Father of Jesus, 
not the divinity of the Gospels, which we have been 
hindered – and still are hindered from approaching, 
precisely by the stumbling block of sacrifice. In effect, 
this sacrificial concept of divinity must ‘die’, and with 
it the whole apparatus of historical Christianity, for 
the Gospels to be able to rise again in our midst, not 
looking like a corpse we have exhumed, but revealed 
as the newest, finest, liveliest and truest thing that we 
have ever set eyes upon.
9 page 51, René Girard, Violence and the Sacred
The sacrificial crisis, that is, the disappearance of the 
sacrificial rites, coincides with the disappearance of 
the difference between impure violence and purify-
ing violence. When this difference has been effaced, 
purification is no longer possible and impure, conta-
gious, reciprocal violence spreads through the com-
munity.
10 page 273, René Girard, Violence and the Sacred
The best men can hope for in their quest for nonvio-
lence is the unanimity-minus-one of the surrogate 
victim.
11 page 205, René Girard, Things Hidden Since the 
Foundation of the World
All that remained unclear in the non-sacrificial read-
ing should have been clarified in the most compre-
hensive way.
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And yet, Christ has died. His early, violent death 
and the meaning of the Passion have grown to be 
considered the very core of Christian dogma, even 
more so than the non-sacrificial announcement of 
God’s Kingdom. Girard wants to liberate the Gospels 
from Pauline Passion, and go back to Christ as an 
example and as a teacher. In a way, he wishes for the 
Judeo-Christian logic – of progressively dissolving 
the need for sacrifice – to reach its conclusive point. 
In the Christian Credo we jump from the birth to the 
death of Christ, as if – to announce His divinity – we 
needed only point to a special kind of birth and a 
special kind of death. As if this would suffice to make 
us welcome the Gospel. The Kingdom was truly 
Christ’s Creed. He didn’t invite awe and worship, but 
proposed a new alliance, as they say, through the 
actuality of the Kingdom of God.
And yet, as Girard points out, we can no longer know 
where the sacred has disappeared12. We look for it, 
we know that it is at the source of art and beauty, but 
we can no longer grasp it, or recognise it. The sacred, 
both in art and politics, can only be forgotten (at 
one’s own peril), or misused (at society’s peril). Ex-
amples of the misuse of the sacred in art are extreme-
ly popular and well accepted (Bill Viola). Examples of 
the misuse of the sacred in politics mark the history 
of despondency, which is our history. Yet the particu-
larity of the suicide bomber is what should drive this 
text forward.
12 page 225, René Girard, Violence and the Sacred
Yet they can no more reply to the question “where 
did the sacred disappear”?
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13 Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, Heroes – mass murder and 
suicide.
14 page 261, René Girard, Things Hidden Since the 
Foundation of the World
What is really frightening today is not the challenge 
of this new meaning, but the Kafkaesque rejection of 
all meaning. What is frightening is the conjunction 
of massive technological power and the spiritual sur-
render to nihilism. A panic-stricken refusal to glance, 
even furtively, in the only direction where meaning 
could still be found dominates our intellectual life.
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We say suicide. Then we say bomber. We are con-
fused by sacrificial logic, for we deny it constantly, 
without intermission. Because we deny it, we are 
prey to it. Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi’s argument – that 
Capitalism’s logic is one of dehumanisation and leads 
inevitably to mass murder and suicide13 – seems 
particularly unfounded and trapped in its own poli-
tics. It falls prey to the common misunderstandings 
surrounding nihilism. It uses nihilism as the ultimate 
enemy, and finds it lurking in Capitalism. In one sen-
tence and for Berardi, Capitalism is nihilism – mass 
murderers are the instrument, the oracles, and the 
logical conclusion of Capital.
Nihilism is also seen by Girard as a contemporary 
problem, a threat to all intellectual life14. There is a 
more than easy parallel between mass murder and 
nihilism that seems to be taken for granted following 
on certain misunderstandings around September 11. 
Yet all this guilt attribution could be just an illusory 
projection, and a romanticising of evil based on an 
ill conceived sacrificial logic. We respect the martyr, 
even if he dies and kills at the same time. We re-
spect his logic, because we do not understand it. We 
respect the contract that emerges from self-sacrifice, 
even if – or because – it is a form of spiritual black-
mail. We want to side with the strongman, the bully, 
the visionary, the butcher. This seems to have fascis-
tic undertones. This seems to point to ill-advised sac-
rificial logic at the heart of our collective and shady 
dealings with terrorism. 
If we think of suicide in the specific lines of Camus, 
Durkheim, Zizek and Simone Weil, we find very 
little that can be applied to the nature of the suicide 
bomber, for the suicide bomber wears the cloak of 
the martyr, and from the martyr he draws his author-
ity.
We can respond to this self-effacement that kills with 
two other types of self-effacement – one that ac-
cepts the authority of the martyr, or one that denies 
it and replaces it with another, radical type of self-
effacement. This last response, of radical love, is what 
Weil called the destruction of the ‘I’15. This path is of 
course not without its pitfalls, as Girard points out 
when establishing a relation between masochism and 
self-sacrifice16. Was Weil a moral masochist? And is 
the suicide bomber a sadist? For our purposes, this 
is irrelevant. For ours is the chance to go beyond the 
sacrificial framework without forgetting its lessons.
Art can easily circumvent the sacrificial logic – it can 
even be argued that this is art’s major starting point – 
the evasion of sacrifice.
We can now look at God not as something to be 
used or refused, but in an etymologically Greek 
sense – God as something that happens17. God is an 
independent verb. This verb doesn’t only hover above 
us, this word, this God. This word can be seen as the 
source of all our grammar, our joys and our prob-
lems. This verb is only the precise description of what 
happens.
The Kingdom that Girard announces as one of the 
possible destinies of Christianity is not a denial of 
the destructive in favour of becoming. Rather it is 
steeped in wisdom and reflection, self-knowledge 
and compassion. We can go back to Vedic philoso-
phy18 and try to conjointly know becoming and de-
struction. Only then can we go beyond death’s reach 
and dominion19.
Only then will we wise up.
Isn’t this a form of illusory hope? Even if it is, let it be 
weak, faint, passive and open.
15 page 26, Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace
There is absolutely no other free act which it is given 
us to accomplish – only the destruction of the ‘I’.
16 page 236, René Girard, Things Hidden Since the 
Foundation of the World
[…] Self-sacrifice can serve to camouflage the forms 
of slavery brought into being by mimetic desire. 
‘Masochism’ can also find expression in self-sacrifice, 
even if a person has no knowledge of this, and no 
wish to reveal it.
17 page 19, Roberto Calasso, La Letteratura e gli dèi
Ma come si manifest ail dio? Nella lingua greca non 
si dà vocativo per théós, ‘dio’, osservó un illustre 
linguista, Jacob Wackernagel. Théos ha innanzitutto 
senso predicativo: designa qialcosa che accade.
But how does the god manifest himself? […] Théos 
designates something that happens.
18 page 41, v.14, The Vedas, A Source Book of Indian 
Philosophy
Becoming and destruction –
He who this pair conjointly knows,
With destruction passing over death,
With becoming wins the immortal.
19 Saint Paul and Dylan Thomas are the source for 
the use of the word dominion here.
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Notes to chapter 4:
All these philosophers are coming to teach us good 
manners but won’t succeed, because we are becoming 
God and destroying God. We are gods.
As for grammar, it is not enough to drop the word 
‘suicide’ before ‘bomber’. But as they say in so many 
jokes, we could call that a good start.
Through the fear of horror, horror is fed. This is why 
our worst fears will definitively become true, if they 
haven’t already.
THE BEGGING PROBLEM
CHAPTER FIVE
The sculptor, and also the related figure of the epic 
poet, is absorbed in the contemplation of images. 
Bereft of images, the Dionysian musician is himself 
wholly pain and original echo of that pain1.
Bereft of images, for images have become phantasms, 
the contemporary creative condition is one where 
the author is split between pain and its original echo. 
Pain is a force beyond what is strictly human, yet one 
that pushes the human further into itself. There is 
no originality in pain, for pain is but a prelude to the 
numb absolutes leading to death. Pain is universal, 
abstract and achingly contingent. Compassion and 
art are possibly counterweights, compensations. For 
Nietzsche, non-contemplative art has to preclude an 
original echo of pain – it echoes pain, rather than 
portraying or revealing it. Here we find the begging 
problem, for the beggar has to speak in echoes rather 
than conveying genuine pain. And here we find Pes-
soa, the Portuguese Modernist poet for whom faking 
it was the only possible form of sincerity.
The beggar is an ironist. He can’t be serious. Without 
irony the beggar would collapse under the weight of 
shame. He acts from necessity, but has to convert the 
specificities of necessity into a story, through irony. 
For Kierkegaard, there is a double hiding game tak-
ing place in irony. The two materials of irony, jest and 
earnestness, are interchangeable and each one hides 
the other2. The beggar is an autobiographer. Auto-
biography is perhaps a deeply problematic endeav-
our, for there seems to be no possible reconciliation 
between shame and irony.
1 page 35, Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy
2 page 74, Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 
Failure, Whitechapel
The ironist hides jest in earnestness, and earnestness 
in jest.
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We are all suckers for the impossibilities of autobi-
ography. It is less important to ask ‘should we believe 
these wild stories’? – than to strategically avoid the 
pitfalls associated with suspension of disbelief. Crisis, 
for Artaud, can only come through belief itself3, 
enthusiasm, abandon. It might be argued that there is 
an incompatibility between crisis and presentation4, 
but crisis can be enunciated, developed, argued, rep-
resented. The beggar delays resolution and stretches 
out his hand, he prolongs crisis, dwells in it.
It always appears problematic to speak about inten-
tionality and sincerity in irony-heavy worlds, but the 
beggar seems to point towards a resolution through 
the juxtaposition of jest and earnestness, and the play 
between the two. Only through irony can the beggar 
escape the pressure of shame, its loop, its contingent 
nature.
There is a freedom in autobiography that makes it 
radical fiction. The guiding principles of that free-
dom reside in the obscured link between spontaneity 
and artificiality5. The play around notions of what 
it is to have a public persona and how these diverge 
from the private sphere should be at the heart of 
autobiographical accounts. Of those tales, we cannot 
guarantee a single word6, and yet we cannot help but 
believe that Augustine actually wept.
We believe that the agitation that we feel while stum-
bling upon the beggar’s account has a source in his 
presumed inner agitation. The form of agitation that 
is more pertinent to our begging story, though, is 
the one that is present in speech itself, in the beggar’s 
account.
Between life and death7, the nature of the beggar’s 
account – its agitation – is also the source of our 
new triangulation, composed of ‘real beggar’, ‘beg-
gar’s account’, and ‘reception of beggar’s account’. In 
Nietzschean terms, the first means ‘pain’, the second 
‘original echo of that pain’, the third fruition and pos-
session.
3 page xxxiii, Antonin Artaud, On Theatre, Brian 
Singleton Introduction
Crisis can only be achieved through belief and not 
through the general modus operandi of western thea-
tre spectating: the suspension of disbelief.
4 page 53, Mark Prince, Failure, Whitechapel
[…] An apparent incompatibility between crisis and 
presentation.
5 page 73, Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man
Can it be that the freedom to feel is greater when 
one’s personality and one’s identity in society are 
quite clearly separated? Can spontaneity and what we 
have learned to call “artificiality” have some hidden 
and necessary relationship? They do; that relation-
ship is embodied in the principle of speech as a mat-
ter of signs rather than symbols.
6 from the title of the MA in Curating exhibition, 
Royal College of Art, 2007
7 page 100, Jean-François Lyotard, The Inhuman
Thanks to art, the soul is returned to the agitated 
zone between life and death, and this agitation is its 
health and its life.
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THE LITTLE SACRIFICES
CHAPTER SIX
Tutto è già una citazione nel momento in cui appare1.
Everything is already citation from the moment it 
appears.
We are left with nothing but little sacrifices. We no 
longer know what they meant by hero. We go about 
our normal lives, until sacrifice explodes in our face. 
You have to go on, you see? You have to endure the 
littleness of things, the minuscule scale of what is 
asked of you. You have to go down in humbleness 
and shame, and visit your little world, which is full of 
trash.
If all post-Auschwitz culture is garbage2, this means 
that all of us are condemned to recycling. Few of us 
get to handle the sordid material, though.
Few of us actually sweep the streets and fewer even 
get to write about sweeping. 
Even God is part of this pile of post-Auschwitz re-
fuse. Even the word holocaust. We are left with noth-
ing but little sacrifices.
We are left with nothing but tiny enigmas. Each 
enigma is a work of art, each event destroys the 
previous one, endlessly pulling you into the future. 
Contemporary art is myopic. We have to focus on 
the tiniest of things, the smallest of events, in order 
to gather sense. We gather it, but we do not make 
it. Contemporary art is rubbish. Recycling, ecology, 
waste, it exceeds the limit of the sensible, it ventures 
into the stuff of life and the stuff of life is leftover 
crap, crass, amalgamated, reused crap. Forget about 
the blank paper magic thing, there is no longer virgin 
white canvas, there is no virgin white paper. Through 
its whiteness, the paper already lies, and the best that 
you can long for is an enigma. All else is meaningless. 
We are left with nothing but tiny enigmas.
1 page 77, Roberto Calasso, la Letteratura e gli dèi.
2 page 2, Theodor W Adorno quoted in Jean-Luc 
Nancy, The Vestige of Art, The Muses.
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We are left with nothing but old love. Old love is 
riddled with nostalgia for what is beyond the text, 
underneath the text. If you write your love down you 
write it away, you write it off. This happens because 
the text starts loving other texts, engaging in spir-
itual intercourse, and dreams your love away. Then 
you return to the real and realise there is no love left, 
except inside the text, except in the infinitive. Your 
love and your text escape you, and you go about your 
daily business. You go into a church and find your 
text praying there, hands clasped in pathetic mum-
bling. You pass by an advertisement and see your text 
in absolute promiscuity. You see a passing stranger 
and realize she is the one you left everything behind 
for. Old love and old texts, lurking behind everything 
that is the domain of the sensible, leaving you with 
the impression that the whole universe is but an af-
tertaste. We are left with nothing but old love.
We are left with nothing but gardening. This plant 
here stands for plant. Flower stands for flower. And 
all this garden is about to die and is about dying. 
Once I dreamt, love, that you had given up on art, 
and given up on drawing. When I asked you, love, 
why you had abandoned art you pointed to the 
garden, love, and said the plants draw for me. Once 
I read a beautiful Tagore book in French, love, when 
we read French poetry together, and I haven’t recov-
ered dear. Le jardinier de l’amour. We are left with 
nothing but gardening.
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We are left with nothing but desire. Desire is com-
posed of arrows piercing us piercing the lover. Don’t 
go all Lacanian on me, my only faraway friend, I have 
had my share of Lacanian paranoia bullshit with its 
aversion to permeability to suffering. He would only 
mark my mistakes, like some nightmarish teacher on 
an old Leonard Cohen song. Desire is the supersti-
tion of the body. It always puzzles me, my only fara-
way friend, when I realize that people don’t make the 
distinction between religion and superstition any-
more. As if it didn’t matter. Well it does. Their whole 
philosophy depends upon it. And so does desire, for 
we need the universe to walk right through us, and 
leaves us blank. We are left with nothing but desire.
We are left with nothing but nothing, but nothing is 
boring. Having nothing better to do we ask nothing 
to deliver us from nothing so nothing bad can hap-
pen to us. When we cease to believe in nothing we go 
back to the nothing that surrounds us in order to es-
cape the thought of the big nothing in the sky. Then 
we say that nothing is dead, and that nothing is deaf, 
and that nothing is blind. We boisterously pronounce 
the dawn of a new nothing, closer to the ground, and 
get depressed on how enmeshed in the big nothing 
the dark peasants still are. We are left with nothing 
but nothing.
We are left with nothing but crisis of meaning, but 
we choose to talk about things less coarse. Each PhD 
dissertation is either a spiked thing or a conceptual 
cloud that looks like a bulldog. Spiked things are 
adorned with quotes, by which it is meant that each 
spike is a quote. Conceptual clouds are ever shifting, 
but work through intimidation. War defences and 
intellectual intimidation – they work because we un-
derstand danger and we respect that which we don’t 
understand. What we don’t understand fills immense 
voids. Political voids, through authority. Spiritual 
voids, through production. We are left with nothing 
but crisis of meaning.
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We are left with nothing but crisis of form, because 
form is a metabolism with an unknown life of its 
own. Form is the enigma and the trophy of modern-
ism. We think we can avoid modernism by renam-
ing it, yet that renaming is what modernism always 
demands from us. Form is an enigma because we 
have no god upon whose lap we can drop it. Form 
is a trophy because we want to avoid the phantasm 
lurking behind it, and raise it high onto a plinth. A 
plinth shaped like a Platonic solid. We are still sitting 
on Plato’s lap. We are left with nothing but crisis of 
form.
We are left with nothing but project. In this sense, 
all is project, and all is drawing. Until the 1980’s, 
projects were for architects, processes for scientists. 
Now everything is a project, as if we had no need for 
decision and materiality. We are left with nothing but 
project.
We are left with nothing but extinction. Old age pes-
simism permeates the young, who then choose not 
to believe. The ears of youth choose not to believe 
in extinction, politics, terrorism, journalism, global 
warming and moon landings. It’s all a hoax. Through 
choice, the arms of the young navigate the real and 
prefer the real. Yet the real is precisely that which is 
threatened with extinction. We are left with nothing 
but extinction.
We are left with nothing but sacrifice. We refuse to 
understand the logic of sacrifice hence we are prey 
to it. We go about our daily business, and accept the 
logic of capital, which is a form of uninterrupted, re-
lentless sacrifice. Because it is uninterrupted, capital 
is also guarded against attack. We are left with noth-
ing but sacrifice.
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We are left with nothing but ritual. Without ritual 
there is no threat of beauty. We are left with nothing 
but ritual.
We are left with nothing but little sacrifices. We are 
all sorry saints, performing minuscule miracles, of-
fering tiny sacrifices as the day unfolds. We have tiny 
wounds, tiny towns, tiny churches, tiny popes. We 
are left with nothing but little sacrifices.
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WEAK THEOLOGY
CHAPTER SEVEN
In the film I silently elucidate everything concerning 
falling1.
There is a simultaneousness between Bas Jan Ader’s 
works and Simone Weil’s reflections on spiritual 
physics that I wish to explore further. Ader’s inter-
est in simple physical forces echoes with Weil’s sense 
of gravity. There is also a deeper parallel, spiritual in 
essence, that I wish to bring light to. The two main 
sources for this comparison are Simone Weil’s Grav-
ity and Grace and Bas Jan Ader’s video Fall 1, and the 
hoped for outcome will be a clarification of how the 
romantic artist still plays a central role in the con-
temporary conditions of art.
All the works of Bas Jan Ader deal either with fall-
ing or with self-inflicted crisis, a crisis that enacts a 
link between meaning and form. Crisis of meaning is 
made manifest through an emptying of the romantic 
model, and crisis of form is played out in a similar 
vein, through a juxtaposition of meaninglessness 
and spirituality, nihilism and purposeful gestural 
utterance. Christianity as a reference has been barely 
explored in Ader’s critical tail, yet the modes and 
archetypes present in Ader can be seen as equally 
indebted to romantic models and Christian ones. The 
sacrificial crisis enacted in Ader is a deeply modern 
one, though, extracted from the narrative safety of 
the Passion, and from other forms of socially attrib-
uting meaning to suffering. Yet Kierkegaard and Weil 
seem to speak directly to the tone with which Ader 
treats sacrifice, a tone that is both desperate and mat-
ter of fact, linked both to physicality and to the life of 
the spirit. 
38
Ader worked primarily between 1967 and 1975, 
mostly in Los Angeles, and was lost at sea in 1975 
while performing a transatlantic journey on what 
would have been the smallest boat to ever cross the 
Atlantic. The piece that took his life was part of a 
conceptual cycle called In Search of the Miraculous, a 
cycle that was to include a recorded night walk in LA 
towards the ocean, a show featuring sea shanties by 
an amateur choir, an ocean crossing and an exhibi-
tion in Amsterdam upon arrival. This last exhibition 
never took place and, because it never took place, is 
a ghost that has begun to haunt art history since the 
late 1990’s.
His previous work dealt with, in his own words, grav-
ity, but can be seen as a bridge between theological 
fall and the physical or circumstantial notions of 
falling. ‘Gravity is the force which above all others 
draws us from God. It impels each creature to seek 
everything which can preserve or enlarge it and, as 
Thucydides says, to exercise all the power of which it 
is capable’. In Ader, this notion of gravity is inverted, 
and the creature submits to a force that can only 
belittle it. 
Ader’s first video dealing with falling, Fall1 Los 
Angeles, is perhaps the most potent. Shot in super 
8 black-and-white film, it shows a suburban house 
with a pitched roof and a man, Bas Jan Ader, sit-
ting on a chair at the very top of the roof. He slowly 
rocks the chair to his right and loses balance, and 
then tumbles and falls from the rooftop on to a bush. 
The film ends. It is perhaps the most powerful of his 
works, together with I’m Too Sad to Tell You (a film 
in which the artist cries for the camera). 
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The power of Fall 1 perhaps springs from the rela-
tion to the burlesque films of Buster Keaton and to 
popular culture’s weekend depiction of accidents and 
curious events, but also to notions of the artist as sac-
rificial vessel for society, and to archetypical figures 
in Western culture such as Ulisses and the difficul-
ties he encountered upon returning home. Fall has 
therefore a most simple and direct articulation, and 
is there for us to see. Bas Jan Ader falls on nothing 
other than himself, he also serves as a bodily sign for 
fall in its widest sense. Gravity and grace are present-
ed as enmeshed, bound together in the artwork. As 
fall happens, our attention increases and is driven to 
a sort of abstract empathy which can be called grace. 
Bas Jan Ader courted modern mysticism not least in 
the title of his last piece, In Search of the Miraculous, 
a title derived from a mystical book by Petyr Demi-
anovich Ouspensky2. It can be argued that he stood 
in relation to Sol LeWitt’s tenets on conceptual art in 
the same way as modern mysticism stands against 
scientific rationalism – adopting its basic rules and 
vocabulary, but rejecting its social form. In this it 
shares a tone with Gravity and Grace.
Simone Weil’s book Gravity and Grace serves as a 
powerful tool to investigate the relationships between 
Bas Jan Ader and a background of Catholicism and 
Greek Tragedy. 
For Simone Weil, the forces that act upon the soul 
are gravity and grace, and the soul can either move 
forward towards necessity or backwards towards the 
stability of sin3. ‘All sins are attempts to fill voids’4, 
but the only force that can truly fill the void is grace. 
Simone Weil establishes a physics of the spirit that is 
only apparently conservative. She repeatedly stands 
in open contradiction to the Catholic tradition, for 
example in situating God decidedly outside creation, 
in accepting atheism as a positive form of purifica-
tion, and in rejecting all manner of consolation and 
social idolatry (for example in the Church’s hierar-
chy). 
1 page 143, Wolfs, Rein (2006), Bas Jan Ader: Please 
Don’t Leave Me
2 page 43, Verwoert, Jan (2006), Bas Jan Ader - In 
Search of the Miraculous
3 page 4, Weil, Simone (2003), Gravity and Grace
4 page 24, Weil, Simone (2003), Gravity and Grace
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Bas Jan Ader also ‘openly contradicts’5  his own tradi-
tion inside conceptual art, for example in his use of 
reward, emotion, and critique through representa-
tion of the romantic figure of the artist as sacrificial 
vessel. 
Weil advocates a sense of perpetual crisis in the 
service of necessity, and this connects to Ader’s par-
ticular use of crisis in the service of determination, 
for example in Fall 1 Los Angeles. Weil has gener-
ally a negative view on falling – ‘one does not fall 
into good’6 – yet it can be argued that her discourse 
on necessity and gravity leaves a space for a flat 
metaphysics, a view that suffering can have spiritual 
significance and use. Weil uses grace as her central 
theme, and posits the loss of self as the way towards 
good and clarification; Bas Jan Ader extracts the 
sublime from its romantic surroundings, exposing its 
innate grotesqueness, and uses the loss of self as the 
very subject of his art. Simone Weil argues that one 
must become the subject of necessity, and that happy 
decisions come about in a physical way, obeying a 
simple force; Bas Jan Ader pushes things towards a 
tipping point, where he lets, in his own words, grav-
ity act upon him. Crisis is the moment of decision, 
the particular moment where the subject surrenders 
to gravity, grace or necessity, and this is true both 
for Ader and Weil. Yet for Weil, one can only trip 
or fall into sin – walking towards necessity involves 
purposefulness. For Ader, fall and rise fold on them-
selves – through watching him fall from a rooftop, 
attention and empathy rise. One can also find simi-
larities between Simone Weil and Bas Jan Ader in 
the way they stood against social prescription. Weil 
stood against all forms of ‘social idolatry’7, an expres-
sion that included all manner of political submission 
and also discourses that used the social as a foremost 
value. 
5 page 12, Verwoert, Jan (2006), Bas Jan Ader - In 
Search of the Miraculous
6 page 77, Weil, Simone (2003), Gravity and Grace, 
7 page xxix, Weil, Simone (2003), Gravity and Grace
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Ader stood against the social validity of the very 
romantic model he extracted from its context, and he 
also stood against the formal and purist dictates of 
conceptual art. In Simone Weil, theology is released 
from the political constraints of Catholicism; in Ader, 
the sacrificial role of the artist is set free from the 
romantic belief system. ‘Suffering without sense’8 is 
perhaps the very core of tragedy, and it is also at the 
core of Weil’s amateur theology and Ader’s amateur 
performances. For Weil, one of the central wisdoms 
of Christianity is to recognize suffering as a tool 
with a ‘supernatural use’9; for Ader, suffering is most 
clearly seen and thought about when it is extracted 
from tragic or romantic uses, until it becomes a thing 
in itself. The question of how to deal with the image 
of suffering affects both Weil’s thought and Bas Jan 
Ader’s works. For Weil, one must be cautious when 
dealing with the imaginary, lest one falls under the 
spell of idolatry. For Ader, idolatry can be trans-
formed and emptied of its common use in tragedy, 
religion, romanticism and popular culture – it can 
become pragmatic. In Weil’s writings, the search for 
equilibrium is bad because it is imaginary – this also 
resonates with Ader’s own search for imbalance, risk, 
and fall, a search that is both fictional and absolutely 
real. Learning to fall is perhaps the very subject of art 
for Ader, as learning to die is the subject of philoso-
phy for Weil. The theme of the destruction of the ‘I’ 
in Simone Weil also has a parallel in Bas Jan Ader’s 
films and performances – Ader finds that there is 
no other way to tackle the social expectations sur-
rounding the role of the artist except through a direct 
contact with the romantic cliché, and this also has to 
do with the destruction of the subject. Humility and 
frailty also unite the two – for Weil, ‘humility consists 
in knowing that there is no source within ourselves 
by which we can rise’10, whereas for Ader frailty and 
concept feed each other. 
8 page 32, Verwoert, Jan (2006), Bas Jan Ader - In 
Search of the Miraculous
9 page xxviii, Weil, Simone (2003), Gravity and 
Grace
10 page 31, Weil, Simone (2003), Gravity and Grace
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11 page 46, Weil, Simone (2003), Gravity and Grace
12 page 8, Verwoert, Jan (2006), Bas Jan Ader - In 
Search of the Miraculous
13 page 52, Weil, Simone (2003), Gravity and Grace
14 page 150, Weil, Simone (2003), Gravity and Grace
Simone Weil praised the status of the intermediary 
– she wrote that one should be a simple intermedi-
ary between ‘the data of a problem and its solution’11. 
Bas Jan Ader took conceptual art’s notions of taking a 
concept to its inevitable and logic conclusion and put 
his body as intermediary between concept and act.
It is easy to mythologize Bas Jan Ader, and project 
onto his accidental death a sort of retrospective sa-
cred glow, a glow that warps all his works with tragic 
tones. Yet this glow can obscure the very fact that 
Ader’s work was not only an extraction of the roman-
tic model, but also a critique of the same model. This 
happened because his last work was ‘about the idea 
of the tragic and became itself a tragedy’12. Ader’s 
work used risk and falling as ways to reflect on our 
primal relationship with nature and thought; it was 
not merely a stunt, nor a flirting with suicide. Simone 
Weil understood that ‘suicide was probably never 
anything else but imaginary’13, by which she might 
have meant that it is a disease of an imagination 
trapped in itself. Bas Jan Ader reduced the imaginary 
until it became necessity, as a way to connect con-
cept and emotion, and his work is not about giving 
yourself over to death, but more to do with a sort of 
intermediary notion of being. For Weil, necessity is 
a stranger to the imaginary. For Ader, the two can be 
conflated and enacted in their purest form, to eluci-
date everything concerning falling.
One other question that can link Weil and Ader is a 
preoccupation with the beautiful in modernity. Weil 
has a more or less traditional approach to the beauti-
ful – for her, ‘the beautiful is the experimental proof 
that the incarnation is possible’14, and that all art of 
the highest order can be seen as religious in nature. 
For Ader, it is the art of the lowest order that can 
be the key to a contained sense of the beautiful. In 
slapstick, melodrama, farce and popular music, Ader 
finds the sublime enclosed in pre-existing structures, 
and extracts it from these contexts to reflect on our 
enduring longing for the miraculous.
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In Fall 1 Los Angeles, falling is extracted from politi-
cal, theological and symbolic orders. Fall is locked in 
itself as a tragic act without context, hence without 
the didactics of tragedy that were so criticized by 
Brecht. Conceptual romanticism thus becomes also 
a way out of the prescriptive, medium-specific and 
formal dictates set out in the beginnings of concep-
tual art by Sol LeWitt15.
Falling is what is expected from a spectacle, secretly 
– the performer can trip, the tragic figure can have 
a real breakdown, the funambulist can fall from 
his rope. In slapstick and circus acts these potenti-
alities become central, evident; in melodrama, the 
breakdown becomes a point from which everything 
irradiates. Bas Jan Ader chose these central acts and 
put them at the service of concepts. These concepts 
were simple orders – ‘a man falls from the rooftop’, ‘a 
man cries in close-up for the camera’, ‘a man crosses 
the Atlantic ocean’, ‘a man falls from a tree’, yet their 
enactment, devoid of context, becomes something 
odd and beautiful, an emotional concept. All fall-
ing is present in that man that falls from the rooftop, 
falling becomes a figure both for necessity and grace, 
passiveness and action, fear and fearlessness. 
It is the notion of necessity that seems highly per-
tinent to performance as it has been understood 
in romantic conceptualism, and especially in the 
work of Bas Jan Ader. It is a form of necessity that is 
both personal and universal, artistic and beyond the 
conscripts of conceptualism, physical and spiritual, 
heroic and fragile, self-inflicted and general in its 
ramifications, performative and absolutely real (the 
man actually falls). One should then expect that fall-
ing, for Ader, was bound both to necessity and to a 
sense of grace, a sense of grace that can be described 
as secularized transcendence. In this it echoes with 
Simone Weil’s version of theology, a theology written 
after God ceased to be philosophically mentionable. 
Weil’s writing recuperates fall through gravity and 
blessedness through grace. It is also a potent frame-
work through which to analyse performative fall in 
the case of Bas Jan Ader.
15 page 12-13, Verwoert, Jan (2006), Bas Jan Ader - 
In Search of the Miraculous
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The notions of crisis of meaning and crisis of form 
seem also to link Simone Weil’s fragmentary work 
with Bas Jan Ader’s conceptual gestures. For Weil, 
meaning seems to be extracted from meaningless-
ness, or as she puts it, the void16. In Ader, meaning 
and form are superimposed in a careful and distant 
consideration of modernistic tropes. In Gravity and 
Grace, idolatry is considered a vital necessity ‘in 
the cave’17, a statement that links Plato’s image from 
the Republic with notions of idolatry which are 
definitively Judeo-Christian. Idolatry, the worship-
ping of images rather than ideals, connects to Ader’s 
flat metaphysics, and to his determination in using 
sources from popular culture. The cave is re-enacted, 
as a means to reflect on its specificities and contin-
gencies. Meaning is at the same time absent and 
overly familiar in its presentation. In Simone Weil, 
meaning is a careful extraction from the void, and 
has to be put to the test of its own crisis, much like 
faith has to be purged through atheism18. The virtues 
of weak faith are presented in both cases as instru-
ments towards clarification.
Pathos in Bas Jan Ader has been extensively studied, 
but, as we mentioned before, not in its relation to 
the Passion or to sacrifice. Both Adorno and Bataille 
point out the artistic locus as one of sacrifice, both 
as the sacrifice of enlightenment and the sacrifice 
of sacrifice itself. In Ader, the usually hidden status 
of sacrifice (the need of its hidden status has been 
pointed out by Girard) is reversed, and sacrifice loses 
its power as knot of being. Sacrifice becomes its own 
justification, not in the classical sense pointed out 
by Girard, but in the sense that Bataille gives it, as en-
ergy expended without profit19. The profitless nature 
of sacrifice is explored to its ultimate consequences, 
not in the sense of a masculine radicalism as in Chris 
Burden, but in a problematical masculinity that has, 
in Christ, a reference to deny or play with. 
16 page 10, Weil, Simone (2003), Gravity and Grace
Grace fills empty spaces but it can only enter where 
there is a void to receive it, and it is grace itself which 
makes this void.
17 page xxix, Weil, Simone (2003), Gravity and Grace
Idolatry is a vital necessity in the cave.
18 page 115, Weil, Simone (2003), Gravity and Grace
Religion in so far as it is a source of consolation is a 
hindrance to true faith: in this sense atheism is a pu-
rification. I have to be atheistic with the part of my-
self which is not made for God. Among those men in 
whom the supernatural part has not been awakened, 
the atheists are right and the believers wrong. 
19 See Bataille who repeatedly talks of sacrifice as 
energy expended without profit, for example in Inner 
Experience.
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In Simone Weil’s life and work, the notions of suffer-
ing and sacrifice verge sometimes on the pathologi-
cal, without losing their power of dissolution into 
clarity and purpose. Here again, we can make a link 
between purposefulness and purposelessness or the 
status of sacrifice in Weil and Ader.
Christ is no romantic hero, as has been thoroughly 
explored by Kierkegaard20, but a companion or 
complement to that hero. In this sense, Christ is an 
absolute tragic archetype that eludes tragedy, be-
cause the knot of his sacrifice still lasts as long as 
Christianity lasts too. In this sense, Christ is neither 
Dionysus nor the pathetic hero in Kierkegaard’s Fear 
and Trembling. Christ is still beyond representa-
tion, in some sense, yet in Bas Jan Ader, he is present 
as an archetype of the lonely Man of Sorrows, but 
also as the figure that, while going into the desert, 
exposes himself to an artificial challenge that precipi-
tates a crisis where grace and gravity play a central 
role. Christ can be viewed as a serial crisis producer, 
someone who, in every situation, provokes a moment 
of truth or lie. The fabric of this crisis production 
can best be described as antisocial. As Simone Weil 
points out, he didn’t pray for the world21 (although he 
also advocated collective prayer, even in secret). His 
antisocial stance resounds with Ader’s take on the 
romantic hero, in that Christ, if viewed as a human 
as in Russell22, is utterly detached from conversation, 
argument, or reasoning. He spoke in parables.
20 Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling
21 page 165, Weil, Simone (2003), Gravity and Grace.
Christ redeemed the vegetative, not the social. He 
didn’t pray for the world.
22 Bertrand Russell, Why I am not a Christian
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It is a particularity of Bas Jan Ader, the fact that he 
was little known in the two decades that followed his 
death at sea. He has been recently recuperated and 
shown in important retrospectives, and is now recog-
nized as someone who infused conceptual art with a 
sort of energy that refuses to die out.
It is also a particularity of Simone Weil, the fact that, 
although she is a major thinker who converted to Ca-
tholicism, she is almost unknown in Catholic circles.
The two were concerned with gravity, risk, falling 
and frailty, and there seems to be a returning interest 
in these issues in contemporary art and performance. 
Their works still talk to each other, and to other past, 
present and future works.
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THE POEM IS A FAKE
CHAPTER EIGHT
The poet is a fake, he feigns so completely that he 
even fakes that it is pain the pain he truly feels1.
There is something deeply camoniano in this verse 
by Pessoa, and also something of universal value to 
all forms of art production, fruition and critique. Ca-
moniano is the term used in Portugal to address that 
which steals from or addresses Camões, the greatest 
XVI century Portuguese poet.
It reminds us of one of Camões’ sonnets via its 
circularity and accuracy of form. Should one substi-
tute faking with loving one would end up with pure 
Camões: ‘the poet is a lover, he is bound to love so 
completely, that he even loves in pain the pain he 
truly feels’. Camões was usually a stranger to irony 
and humour (never made me laugh) – Pessoa is 
faking to be himself while simply adding a modern 
concept in substitution for love. Faking is sincerity 
articulated. Faking is love articulated into the mod-
ern. Faking is materialized through an act of theft 
and concealment that deals with concealment itself. 
The poem performs itself in infinite mirroring. Like 
sacrificial logic, the poem conceals and reveals at the 
same time.
Despite or because it is an act of concealment itself, 
the verse discloses something enormous about the 
nature of artistic production – it exposes the dou-
ble layer of falsity in the object and the double layer 
of falsity in the mirror, at work in the making of a 
poem. The poem, if seen in the light of the Camões 
reference, is itself a form of faking it, historically, 
critically, poetically. It performs what it says. Its cir-
cularity keeps it from falling or vanishing into mean-
ing2. The poem is a fake.
1 Fernando Pessoa, Autopsicografia
2 Paul Valery, Poems
A bad poem is one that vanishes into meaning
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How are we to understand the importance of fak-
ing it in modern and contemporary instances of art 
production? More importantly, can we do so without 
getting trapped in overused economies to do with the 
grotesque, the carnivalesque and masquerading? I 
believe we can, just as I believe that the verse’s opera-
tion remains intact, despite ninety years of separa-
tion, ninety years of faking it. I would like to explore 
three forms of heteronymity in the works of Kierkeg-
aard, Philip Guston and Bas Jan Ader, searching for 
answers about the two layers of falsity proposed by 
the poem.
Prior to that engagement, let me elaborate on what 
I mean by doubling. It has to do with actuality and 
representation in their correlation. Consider the 
beggar with his hand outstretched, murmuring a tale 
of misery. He might have had his moment of sincer-
ity – or he might not – when he first had to beg. Now 
he is perpetually condemned to re-enact that mo-
ment over and over again. The beggar has to fake the 
misery he truly inhabits, he has to perform autobiog-
raphy and see that autobiography fall into a kind of 
loop (the loop of shame). The two layers of the heart 
mimic each other, forming a sort of mechanism, an 
automaton. 
For autobiography is shameful, uncomfortable, 
Augustinian to the bone. It might represent nothing 
when put against an artist’s work, yet it is a nothing 
that first set things in motion through the loop of 
shame, deceit and concealment, and continues to do 
so throughout an artistic life.
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What was Philip Guston concealing before he put a 
hood on himself and reinvented his practice through 
concealment itself? What was he concealing? His 
erasure of history through changing his name from 
Goldstein? The fact that his father was a poor junk-
yard man, ashamed of his humiliating trade, a shame 
that might have been connected to his suicide? Was 
Guston concealing concealment and perpetual crisis? 
When he painted The Studio and started his third 
incarnation, this much was true – Guston became 
pathetic, ridiculous, in crisis, and managed, through 
this, to have a non-messianic practice in the prophet-
infested New York. Guston survives because he too 
is a faker exposing the tools of his trade – his father’s 
trash, art history’s trash, the trash that comes with 
the guilt of concealment itself, plus his brushes, 
easels, cigarette butts and propensity for Russian 
morbid depression. Philip Guston, through open 
concealment, began faking it.
Philip Guston was a painter of all things forgotten, 
not only in the sense of his subject matter (shoes, 
junk, trash), but also in a methodological sense. He 
scavenged not only art history, but also Kierkegaard 
and his childhood fascination with cartoons. Unlike 
Picasso, who digested everything with carnivorous 
masculinity, Guston preferred not to know what he 
was doing, and sustain a sense of anxiety and pa-
thetic crisis, the likes of which can also be found in 
Manet and Les Demoiselles – a sense of not known 
knowledge emerging. Kierkegaard was gloriously 
misread by Guston – he basically substituted God 
and faith with painting. ‘The paradox of painting is 
this – that there is an interiority that is incommen-
surable with the exterior3’, he could have read in Fear 
and Trembling. And, unlike the so-called abstract ex-
pressionists (who all wanted to be the last painter in 
perpetual, heroic endgames), Guston ‘got no further 
than painting4’. 
3 Soren Kierkegaard on Irony
The ironist hides jest in earnestness, and earnestness 
in jest
4 Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling
Abraham got no further than faith.
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This does not mean that Guston ignored the impasse 
of painting and the ruin of painting, but, after the 
end of the world, instead of becoming a prophet late 
for class he chose to be a nobody, smoke and scav-
enge. In Kierkegaard (as he could also have found 
in Pessoa), Guston met a fellow heteronymic self, a 
companion in anxiety. And, against Ad Reinhardt’s 
prescriptive stance, Guston would argue that the art-
ist should not want to be right.
In a 1931 John Barrymore Hollywood film, Philip 
Guston appears in the background as a young paint-
er, with beret and beard. Guston worked as an extra 
intermittently throughout the thirties, an activity that 
must have blended well with his taste for cinema and 
the dramatic arts. Philip Guston is the extra painter 
in both senses of the word: firstly, reinventing himself 
radically three times throughout his career, making 
the impossibility of painting something fruitful, fall-
ing outside all canons and classifications; secondly, 
using his own effigy as sign for painter – not only in 
Hollywood movies (with beret) but also in his later 
paintings (with hood). He faked it and lived it at the 
same time.
Now we can proceed to Bas Jan Ader, and see how 
the double layer of falsity and sincerity applies to his 
work and life. It is important to isolate Ader’s work 
from the posthumous martyrdom hues that serve 
only to obscure the very nature of his works. In Ader, 
the issue of intentionality and forgery is contentious, 
for Ader actually cries and actually falls. Yet even 
suicide would have been imaginary, using a term 
both from Weil and Zizek to describe that act. The 
actuality of physical involvement on the part of Bas 
Jan Ader owes as much to the burlesque as it owes to 
the begging problem described above. Ader reaches 
out his hand, not unlike the beggar.
Ader, becoming an instrument of gravity, and enact-
ing these simple actions, became another kind of in-
strument as well – that of open concealment. Again, 
we can link this operation to the tabooed nature of 
sacrifice and to matter-of-factness of Pessoa’s verse.
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Kierkegaard was Philip Guston’s favorite writer, 
alongside Dostoyevsky. They shared the same kind 
of monomania – Kierkegaard with regard to hetero-
nymic, twisted theology, and Guston with regard to 
painting. They also shared a sense of perpetual crisis, 
with anguish as the motor for it all and irony as the 
only redeeming quality. Kierkegaard, like Pessoa, is 
nowhere to be found. Does he even believe in God? 
He decomposed himself into specific voices for spe-
cific problems, incarnating character, deceit, forgery, 
in order to recuperate something long lost. What that 
something was isn’t clear – it might have been love, 
faith, God, or unbridled humour.
Kierkegaard, like Pessoa, divided himself into two 
legions: outmoded characters, and characters that 
seemed to be freer than themselves. Pessoa never 
left Lisboa, yet his heteronyms had to travel quite 
frequently. Kierkegaard had a complex faith, but he 
could speak both from agnosticism and against it, 
both from a position of dread and one of doubt.
Perhaps the secret of heteronymity, as Pessoa once 
suggested, is that of amputation. We are multitudes, 
and can choose to create character and voice through 
subtraction. Again, we see a link to psychological 
crisis and sacrifice, for they both work also through 
amputation and subtraction.
Let us return to the fake verse about faking it. Let us 
acknowledge that crisis of meaning and crisis of form 
are deeply connected in these four creators – Guston, 
Pessoa, Ader and Kierkegaard. A bad poem, Valery 
once wrote, is one that disappears into meaning. A 
fake verse about faking it seems to continue its jour-
ney into actuality, eluding definitive meaning.
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DRAWING AFTER DUCHAMP
CHAPTER NINE
Não fez Deus o céu em xadrez de estrelas, como os 
pregadores fazem o sermão em xadrez de palavras”1
Before he devoted himself to the beauty of chess, but 
already when his interest in painting was starting to 
dwindle, Marcel Duchamp spent a season in Monte 
Carlo, trying to outwit the roulette. He was con-
vinced it was possible to devise a method to predict 
its whims, a system to enter chaos. ‘You see’ he said, ‘I 
have not ceased to be a painter; I am now drawing on 
chance’2. A gambler is a creature that is overtaken by 
a drive, and possessed by it; Duchamp, on the contra-
ry, observed the spinning with perfect detachment. 
His posture was a purely modern one, with what 
Roberto Calasso called the ‘godless gaze of which 
only mystics are capable’, in which the eyes ‘are not 
unduly alarmed’ by chaos, but are instead ‘thrilled by 
the prospect of inventing some strategic move within 
that chaos, a new game that makes all previous ones 
seem Ciceronian’3. It is clear that Duchamp began 
to abandon painting through drawing – on his way 
to ‘The Large Glass’, and that drawing continued to 
be for him a site of experimentation throughout his 
life. The reasons for his abandonment of painting 
were sensorial and historical – he confessed feel-
ing revulsion for its sensuous features (as well as for 
the filling-in of painting4 and for the function of ‘la 
patte’ in the whole process) but he also questioned 
the ability of painting to speak directly to the ‘grey 
matter’ like the masters of old. ‘Mechanical drawing 
was the saving clause’5, he later explained. By rest-
ing outside the available codes of painting, technical 
drawing provided a means to escape both the fami-
lies of modern painting and the ‘danger of the hand’. 
By stressing that he wanted ‘to unlearn how to draw’ 
while drawing, Duchamp was also acknowledging 
the wealth of drawing – its capacity to dodge habit, 
regenerate, be faithful to thought and, later, to appeal 
to the mind alone. 
1 page185, Vieira, Padre António, Sermão da sexa-
gésima in Sermões
2 page 259, Tomkins, Calvin, Duchamp: a biography, 
Chatto & Windus, 1997 
3 page 40, Calasso, Roberto, The Ruin of Kasch, 
Cambridge Massachussetts, Belknap Press - Harvard 
University Press, 1996
The Modern is born when the eyes observing the 
world discern in it ‘this chaos, this monstrous confu-
sion’, but are not unduly alarmed. On the contrary, 
they are thrilled by the prospect of inventing some 
strategic move within that chaos, a new game that 
makes all the previous ones seem Ciceronian. It is a 
godless gaze of which only mystics are capable […] 
4 page 18, Cabanne, Pierre, Dialogues with Marcel 
Duchamp, London: Thames and Hudson, 1971
When you make a painting, even abstract, there is a 
sort of necessary filling-in. I wondered why.”; “I think 
painting dies, you understand. After forty or fifty 
years its freshness disappears. […] Men are mortal, 
pictures too.
5 page126-7, Tomkins, Calvin, Duchamp: a biogra-
phy, Chatto & Windus, 1997
Mechanical drawing was the saving clause. A straight 
line done with the ruler, not with the hand. Forget-
ting the hand completely, that is the idea […]. I 
unlearned to draw…I actually had to forget with the 
hand”.
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It can be argued that drawing had an exceptional role 
in Duchamp’s practice and conceptual maturing – to 
a point where we can find no rupture, no abandon-
ment of its logic, but a progressive shift in the values 
and qualities attributed to investigation.  In this 
sense, through Duchamp, drawing was displaced as 
strategy into the spheres of action, prospective ges-
ture and critical distance embedded in the artwork.  
We can continue our argument while going through 
some of Duchamp’s more important steps, beginning 
with the Grand Verre. It would be inappropriate to 
list here all the families of art-historical interpreta-
tions for the ‘Large Glass’ – Duchamp’s first major 
work outside painting – but I would prefer to suggest 
the hypotheses that it can be read as a drawing. More 
precisely, that it is suspended between drawing and 
screen – a drawing delayed6 in glass by the absence of 
ground. It also shares with drawing the fact that it is 
a confrontation of a strategy with the world – except 
that, in this case, we can actually see the world on 
the other side of the sheet. It is a drawing stripped 
to an imagined essence – a thought of drawing – it 
is bared even of the virgin white7 of paper, rendered 
problematic as image. The ‘Large Glass’ is a phantom 
of drawing. There we can see how the screen of the 
ancient perspectivists is put to another use, and how 
it tries to capture projections that emanate from an 
imaginary dimension (the ambitions of the anamor-
phosis are radicalised). We can also see in Duchamp’s 
meticulous collection of every study for the ‘Large 
Glass’ (which were later collected in the ‘Green Box’) 
as a re-enactment of Da Vinci’s dream – drawing as 
the pursuit of total knowledge, encapsulating the uni-
verse through the magic of reduction. But drawing 
is now condemned to be fragmented, infinitely more 
‘undecipherable’ than Da Vinci’s inverted text. Draw-
ing appears in the most disparate scraps of paper, as 
something disposable and sacred, obsolete and de-
terminant. It is said that he was acting as a Leonardo, 
but ‘a Leonardo who was sick and tired of glue’8. 
6 page 26, Duchamp, Marcel, The essential writings 
of Marcel Duchamp salt seller, marchand du sel, Lon-
don, Thames and Hudson, 1975
[…] A delay in glass as you would say a poem in 
prose or spittoon in silver.
7 page 35, Duve, Thierry De, Pictorial nominalism 
on Marcel Duchamp’s passage from painting to the 
readymade, University of Minnesota Press, 1991
Virgin: the virgin canvas, the point of departure for 
the painter and the initial site in which his desire and 
his anguish are invested. How to become a painter, 
how to begin the painting? This was a crucial ques-
tion for Duchamp, much more important than the 
completion of the painting.
8 page 10, Lyotard, Jean Francois, Duchamp’s 
TRANS/formers, The Lapis Press, 1990
[…] Scribblings on bits of paper in the Boxes, ingen-
ious projects in the style of Leonardo; but maybe a 
Leonardo who is sick and tired of glue.
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Here we can follow a sort of disseverment of drawing 
into its constituents – a process that opened a mul-
titude of trap doors that we sometimes identify with 
collage, appropriation, and the distance from object 
to artwork. Hence it seems possible to connect the 
central role that Duchamp gave to the gap between 
the Large Glass and the Green Box (interpretation 
derived from reflecting procedural issues rather than 
objective features) to the uses of the readymade. In 
the Green Box’s relation to the Large Glass, draw-
ing is used as a place of departure and investigation, 
relating to an oppositional work. Duchamp’s main 
driving force and interest lay in the distance between 
the two – in potency or reflection. In this sense, 
critical relevance is what is gained in the transla-
tion between the two poles of reference. Drawing 
becomes part of the artwork, inasmuch as it leads to 
a critical engagement outside its immediate con-
straints as a medium. Therefore it is used as probe 
and reflective surface. Drawing draws its strength 
from its imbalance, from a perpetual state of enquiry, 
and its tendency to reiterate the artwork as a site of 
procedure or interval.  We can connect this emphasis 
on procedure or interval with the birth of the ready-
made. After moving to New York, Marcel Duchamp 
slowly became aware of the potential of these found, 
signed objects – the readymades. For our purposes 
it is especially significant that he classified the work 
‘Three Standard Stoppages’ as a readymade – a work 
that recorded both the distance between drawing 
and sculpture and a chance event, a found phenom-
enon. Being his favourite readymade ‘Three Stand-
ard Stoppages’ comprised three drawings and three 
‘profiles’ in wood, and was intended to be a capturing 
of chance – it documented the distortions of three 
threads fallen from a height of one meter. Most of the 
other readymades consisted, more simply, of found 
and signed objects, with minor interventions or ad-
ditions. The act of signing, which invested the thing 
made with the aura of the artist, was radically dis-
placed. Art could no longer claim a position of truth; 
the ‘magic’ was ‘delivered from the lie’9. 
9 page 143, Adorno, Theodor W., Minima moralia 
Reflections from damaged life, Verso, 1974
Art is magic delivered from the lie of being truth. 
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Art had been ‘thought through to the end’10. The 
way to free this magic from the lie of being truth 
had something to do with making it face its very 
construction and origin. Here begins the rise of a 
certain mood, which implies vigilance not against 
tricks or theatricality, but against the instrumentality 
of tricks and the recuperations of theatre as image. 
There is a shift that puts drawing in the central point 
of a spinning process, a point where it is no longer 
recognizable as such. Rather than being irrelevant 
to contemporary issues in art, drawing has become 
simply barely visible, like a blind spot. Drawing’s 
attributes as a site of departure and open confronta-
tion of a strategy with the world became independ-
ent and loose from their originally strict, academic 
determinations.  We can follow a constant return to 
drawing throughout Duchamp’s life – producing at-
tractive etchings, studies for ‘Etant Donées…’, relics, 
sketches. Maybe because he ‘dreamt of rarity’11, and 
drawing is one of the fields for the thoughtful search. 
Even if rarity has to be performed, and is no longer 
an immanent quality, drawing adapts to this insta-
bility, this make-belief. Drawing’s failings, its open-
ended and incomplete character echoed Duchamp’s 
own sensitivity. The game of chess came to be one of 
Duchamp’s favorite drawing sessions, once he retired 
from the art-world’s chess of words. He too used 
disegno as a «floating signifier»12, but in a passive 
way. The habits of production that regulated most of 
the artists’ days were aberrations to Duchamp. He 
performed the improbable – not unlike an Adam 
before the Fall (before work), he waited for drawings 
to come to him, to be picked.
Drawing is now best defined in conjunction with 
what it no longer is, instead of by purely medium-
specific historicity and focus. That medium-specific-
ity tends to betray drawing’s openness and strategic 
place in artistic processes, in favour of a certain 
fetishizing of elegance and a forced sense of belong-
ing to an artistic family. 
10 page 3, Nancy, Jean-Luc, The Muses, Stanford 
University Press, 1996
Art has been thought through to the end” (Quoting 
Marcel Duchamp). 
11 page 69, Cabanne, Pierre, Dialogues with Marcel 
Duchamp, London: Thames and Hudson, 1971 
In the production of any genius, great painter or 
great artist, there are really only four or five things 
that really count in this life. The rest is everyday 
filler. […] I dream of rarity, what otherwise could be 
known as a superior aesthetic.  
12 page 80, Didi-Huberman, Georges, Confronting 
Images – Questioning the Ends of a certain History 
of Art, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005
Disegno was effectively a magic word for him, first 
because it is polysemic, antithetical, infinitely manip-
ulatable. It is almost a floating signifier – and Vasari 
did not hesitate to use it as such.
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What drawing no longer is can help to reflect on 
strategies and displacements in contemporary prac-
tices, as well as to recover from an appreciation of 
cloistered elegance that is a problematic feature of 
many reflections around drawing. Drawing used to 
have a central role as a figure and tool of both in-
stability and recuperation. Having lost this role as 
a producer of imbalances and collections, drawing 
shifted elsewhere, while leaving its main features to 
be transmuted into multiple strategic and procedural 
approaches of art production. To reflect on how this 
shift began, Duchamp’s example is especially impor-
tant, as we can begin to identify it at its inception, 
as a shift that surpassed the bounds of the histori-
cal avant-garde and is still active today. It is active 
and visible in the relational questions posed to the 
artwork as it reverts to its origins and processes of 
coming into being. 
In the sense that drawing is one of the archetypical, 
purest forms of appropriation, it gives a privileged 
perspective and clarity to the ways in which artworks 
relate to multiple pre-existing dimensions. In this 
sense, a dual proposition can be inferred.
1. Drawing is best viewed and perceived outside 
its former constraints (questions of medium and 
objecthood), and its pertinence coincides with its 
fragmented condition and relational qualities.
2. The disappearance of drawing as a structur-
ing tool of investigation and determination of the 
artwork can be connected to the emergence of multi-
ple strategies of enquiry, but nevertheless can illumi-
nate our reflection upon these strategies.
In spite of common perceptions, drawing didn’t dis-
appear through the invalidation of obsolete qualities 
such as preparation and demonstration – instead, its 
shift was determinant in the creation of major spaces 
of reflection in contemporary practices. There was an 
overflow of drawing’s constitutive procedures back 
into the centre of art production, parallel to a scat-
tering of drawing’s identifiable manifestations into 
unpredictable, ever negotiable settings.
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A MERE ILLUSTRATION
CHAPTER TEN
Illustration is inherently alchemical, for it is a syn-
thesis of the already synthetic pursuit that is drawing. 
For drawing is always less than something else1, it 
simplifies through graphic thought, and illustration 
takes drawing as starting point – as if there was not 
sufficient thought in it, as if drawing was somehow 
incomplete and severe. Like drawing, illustration 
sits at a distance from pictorial convention – this is 
why it might be helpful to think of Duchamp as a 
cartoonist. He was indeed an amateur cartoonist in 
his early teens, but it seems that all his life he wanted 
to sit at a distance from pictorial convention, thrive 
in irony, and speak directly to the brain. Duchamp 
used mechanical drawing – which is illustrative – as 
an escape from taste, and an escape from pictorial 
convention2, on his way out of painting. Why is this 
link between Duchampian escape and illustration not 
recognised for what it is? Because illustration is seen 
as a conservative island where the questions of art 
do not apply. But what if they do apply? What if the 
modernist agony of fiction3 that stems from Manet 
was indeed only the liberation of the thought of 
painting from painting itself? We are left with phan-
tasms of narrative, just like we are left with the ghosts 
of drawing.
Francisco de Holanda called drawing the knowledge 
of the science of painting4, and indeed that seems 
to chime with Renaissance ideas of drawing as the 
ultimate demonstration5. For Francisco de Holanda, 
drawing comes from God, who has the ultimate 
and eternal knowledge6. Drawing turns the invisible 
into visible7. Drawing is everything8. Divine gram-
mar, grammar of all that has been created, is, and 
will be created. It is possible to see the link between 
Duchamp and Renaissance thought. Duchamp turns 
away from the Jesuitical adventure, as Malraux called 
it, only to end up with versions of the Perspectivists’ 
screens, technical drawing, and a collector’s colonial 
occupation of the industrial object.
1 page 65, Vítor Manuel Oliveira da Silva, Ética e 
Política do Desenho
As categorias do pensamento gráfico enunciam a 
presença visual e a doação sensível como arte da sim-
plificação. Arte coerente, independente e consistente, 
a qual prescreve esse menos que faz a singularidade 
do seu pensamento.
The categories of graphic thought enunciate the vis-
ible presence and sensible donation as art of sim-
plification. This is a coherent art, independent and 
consistent, that prescribes that less that forms the 
singularity of its thought.
2 page 48, Pierre Cabanne, Dialogues with Marcel 
Duchamp
PC – What have you done to escape taste?
MD – Mechanical Drawing. It upholds no taste, since 
it is outside all pictorial convention.
3 page 89, André Malraux, As Vozes do Siêncio
A aventura jesuíta, iniciada com a exploração da 
ficção dos grandes italianos, acaba, na agonia da 
ficção, com o triunfo de Manet.
The Jesuitic adventure, initiated with the exploration 
of the great Italians, finishes, in the agony of fiction, 
with the triumph of Manet.
4 page 15, Francisco de Holanda
[…] No entendimento da arte e ciência da pintura 
que é o desenho […]
Drawing is the understanding of the arte and science 
of painting.
5 page 24, Filippo Baldinucci, Vocabolario Toscano 
dell’Arte del Disegno
DIsegno / Un apparente dimostrazione con linee di 
quelle cose, che prima l’ uomo coll’ animo se aveva 
concepito, e nell’ idea imaginate […]
Drawing / an apparent demonstration with lines of 
something that man has conceived with his soul, and 
imagined as idea.
6 page 20, Francisco de Holanda
E assim como este desenho, criado no entendimento 
ou imaginativa, é nascido da eterna ciência incriada 
na nossa: assim a nossa ideia criada dá a origem e 
invenção a todas as outras obras, artes e ofícios que 
usam os mortais.
And thus, as this drawing, first created in under-
standing or imagination, is born of the uncreated 
science in our own science; so our created idea gives 
origin and invention to all other artworks and crafts 
used by the mortals.
7 page 25, Francisco de Holanda
Serve sobretudo o Desenho de levantar o espírito 
a Deus, pelas coisas visíveis às invisíveis, vendo o 
mundo e o mar e o céu, com olhos mais claros que 
outros em sua pintura.
Drawing’s purpose is above all to lift the spirit unto 
God, passing from things visible to things invisible, 
and seeing the world and the sea and the heavens 
with clearer eyes than others, regarding one’s own 
painting.
8 page 26, Francisco de Holanda
[…] Que tudo é debuxo […]
[…] That all is drawing […]
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All this is drawing, all this is illustration.
It might be true that illustration sits at a distance 
from pictorial convention, but this distance makes it 
prone to be an integral part of our ongoing modern 
process, rather than a justly placed anathema field 
for art studies. In drawing, process and result are and 
have been equivalent, like logic and art for Wittgen-
stein and Kosuth9. Illustration sits on drawing and 
takes its procedural modes to an extreme. What this 
extreme is seems to remain free of the universal, 
casuistic, and contingent.
Drawing is always an early form of denomination10, 
a project, a materialised process. Illustration can 
be seen as an addition to project in which narrative 
concerns are to be expected. Yet illustration can deal 
with these expectations in several ways – through ob-
struction, distortion and perversion.
A mere illustration is the thing that artists most de-
spise and run away from, for illustration is imagined 
to be a kind of conveyor belt, spewing out the objects 
of bad taste, the obvious and the sincere.
9 page 91, Joseph Kosuth, Exemplar: Felix Gonzalez-
Torres 1994, Failure, Whitechapel
What is the character of such ‘tests’? As Wittgenstein 
put it: ‘In Mathematics and logic, process and result 
are equivalent’. The same, I would maintain, can be 
said of art.
10 page 205, Vítor Manuel Oliveira da Silva, Ética e 
Política do Desenho
Na etimologia latina do nome designare, o sen-
tido indiciário do signo que aponta, que assinala, 
que mostra ser sinal de qualquer coisa e significar 
qualquer coisa, conjuga o sentido de uma nomeação 
antecipada, de um projecto.
In the Latin etymology of the word designare, the 
indicating sense of something that signals, points 
to, and shows itself to be the sign of something else, 
gathers the sense of anticipated nomination, and of 
project.
     59
COMEDIC CRISIS
CHAPTER ELEVEN
Comics aren’t composed of text and image, but of 
time and ether, thought and world. It is more rig-
orous to say – comics exist in between worlds, in 
between text and image, and in the folds that lay time 
and the page together.
The composition of comics is as mysterious as any 
other composition, and as driven by necessity and 
doubt as any other composition.
Comics, it is hoped, will always be for kids, as all art 
forms. Yet the strength of comics comes from an ex-
pectation of innocence that is always prone to being 
duped, and always archetypically present. 
The world of the comics’ author is unlike any other 
apparatus of production, for the conveying of this 
world, riddled with lies and direct access to the 
unconscious, can be unbridled by cooperation and 
negotiation. It is neither cinema of the poor, nor poor 
cinema, but form in itself, a form of poverty and 
labour that cannot help but to be true to poetics.
Extraction of comics for fine art contexts cannot be 
circumscribed to Pop art, for it is a question of dis-
play. Displaying comics is impossible, but in the same 
manner that all museums are, in a way, impossible 
endeavours. The museum tries to perform an act of 
magic, and we are all much too old for all that. 
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Consider the paranoia of the thought bubble. And 
the promiscuity of speech balloons. The grammar of 
comics has very little to do with these little gadgets. 
It is as if we considered all written language to be 
characterised by the threat of capitalisation and the 
overuse of the exclamation mark. 
Comics aren’t the future for there is no future, in the 
sense that each individual work of art has to redefine 
not only its own discipline but all possible relations 
between disciplines.
The grammar of comics needn’t be seen as coarse, 
simplified discourse. It needn’t be seen as corrupted 
language or promiscuous image. The grammar of 
comics is like any other apparatus of production – 
you always have to infuse it with mouth-to-mouth 
resuscitation. 
Comics are kids’ stuff, very much like our inner 
language is still marked by the distance we encoun-
tered between things and names when we were little. 
Poetry starts when an idiot points to the sea and pro-
nounces a verdict like ‘it looks like olive oil’1. Comics 
start when we encounter a specific form of collabora-
tion and negation between images and texts.
Comics are a form of critical reflection on the collab-
oration and negation that happens in the interstices 
of text and image, thought and world.
Autobiography and image production have always 
had a similitude. Harvey Pekar is similar to Augus-
tine, Pekar is an Augustine without the evasion of 
crisis of meaning that comes through the theatrical-
ity of the subject. Joseph Kosuth was always a car-
toonist, no matter how much philosophy he throws 
in your face. His work is primarily concerned with a 
juxtaposition of thought and world, text and image, 
definition and thing in itself. All this is the stuff of 
comics.
1 from Cesare Pavese, O Oficio de VIver
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Obscenity is easily reached in comics, for each panel 
is a little withdrawn curtain onto the world of the 
author. Obscenity means – what is beyond the scene. 
Comics are concerned with scenes. Making a scene, 
developing a scene, showing what is beyond and 
below the public persona of the author. In this last 
sense, comics are huge lies.
Comics are a disease that corrupts the young, spreads 
spiritual pestilence, and is born of the marriage of 
text and image – a marriage that is as pernicious to 
the two forms of art involved as it is to the reader. 
Comics are unwholesome, for they happen in the 
mind, and they are based on a misleading kind of 
beauty – a beauty that disguises pure evil. Literature 
is evil2, art is evil, yet comics are hypocritical, layered, 
lying evil. Be not surprised if you encounter scan-
dal where comics abound. Comics are the spirit of 
perversion3.
There are those who defend that in comics only that 
which is specific to comics should happen. That 
means that filmic, literary and artistic influences 
shouldn’t burden the medium with pathologies of 
adaptation. Even though it seems apparently a good 
point, it seeks to circumvent the question of the in-
herent promiscuity of the medium. 
Comics are promiscuous. They drink from the foun-
tain of life (truth) as well as the fountain of art (lie). 
Comics absorb all that is visual and all that is textual, 
and produce something that is both and that is nei-
ther. What influences comics is the cosmos. 
Love of comics is a form of lust, for comics do not 
love you back. This is why some comics bookshops 
still feel slightly creepy. Forty-year-old men can be 
found chasing phantasms of youth, quietly, guiltily 
browsing super beings in tight-fitting clothes. The 
shop next door sells porn.
2 from Bataille
3 from Edgar Allan Poe, The black cat
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God is everywhere in comics, for the comics au-
thor is God. The comics author is the puppeteer, the 
subject and the master of what he does. God is the 
substance, the origin and the stuff of comics.
A comic is art if it doesn’t try to be art. This is true 
of all art and all comics. The best piece of advice 
you can give to a young artist is not to try to do art. 
This doesn’t mean they should follow their heart and 
speak truthfully. Quite the contrary, it is an invitation 
to betrayal.
Hear this. I am not a comics manifesto, nor a justifi-
cation for comics to exist, to be produced, and to be 
read. Here speaks the comedic crisis.
Comics are trash. Like all trash, they are the sole de-
positaries of anything that has any power left in it.
- I do comics.
- So you spend most of your time sitting at a 
desk?
The whole western world is sitting at a desk, but the 
comics author is still humorous while being there, he 
is pathetic.
- I am a graphic novelist.
Silence ensues. A nod, a moment of respect. Pathetic.
Graphic novels are comics with an aura. Because we 
can no longer have auratic art, because we recognise 
the slogan, we can say this specific saint is a scoun-
drel.
It is as if we had renamed movies Speaking, Moving 
Literature, as Daniel Clowes once wrote. Which we 
would have had, if the function of capital had de-
manded it. Graphic novels are the future. Behold the 
new bookshelf, with academic studies supporting it, 
and no misunderstandings in the passersby. That all 
art is misunderstanding seems to be forgotten. 
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Beware of Ware, for he is the only author that has 
punctured the Goldsmiths library and made it to the 
shelf. He is alone there. There is absolutely no other 
comic book there, believe me. Beware, for they all say 
something. They all say that Ware is beyond comics, 
as if the rest was youthful, mindless crap. Beware.
Mind the gap between image and text. What hap-
pens there is beyond the visible and yet not wholly 
invisible. Once I saw psychologists studying the eye 
movement of comics readers with sophisticated, 
highly tuned technology. As if we all still believed in 
maps and studied Deleuze.
Perhaps comics are destined to perish, we just don’t 
know. Maybe they are a clunky operation between 
drawing and time, to be swept away by another 
technology. There must have been firm believers in 
the manuscript, the magic lantern4, the stereoscope. 
There was a grammar attached to all these, a theory 
and a craft. They are still legible, though – in mu-
seums and private homes, somewhere. Perhaps the 
whole history of comics will constitute nothing more 
than a curiosity - something that happened between 
the industrial revolution and something else. What 
this something else is might have nothing to do with 
what we now call digital. We just don’t know.
If it hadn’t been done before, the story of Christ 
should have been an interesting comic to do. If Ches-
ter Brown and Dostoevsky hadn’t spoiled the whole 
affair for the rest of us with the inconvenience of 
masterpieces.
4 Daniel Clowes, in Modern Cartoonist
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When I was eight I once sat at a table with a stack 
of paper, ready to start an enormous autobiography. 
Then my aunts came in, and asked me what I was 
going to do. I answered – an illustrated autobiogra-
phy. They laughed and laughed. I blushed and hid the 
paper back in the drawer. What I could have done 
still haunts me a bit. Maybe it is time to go back to 
that drawer, and see if the paper is still there.
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THE BURNING BUSH
CHAPTER TWELVE
Consider the burning bush but forget the mysti-
cal apparatus around it. Through the burning bush 
a voice has its place in a fire that doesn’t cause de-
struction, a fire that supports itself without trying to 
conquer and consume. 
Consider a drawing by Adam Chodzko – invitation 
to describe a fire, for people with stutters. 
Art is of course the burning bush and we are all baf-
fled little Moses, trying to describe a fire to people 
who missed the show.
We show the press release, the Ten Commandments, 
or whatever pathetic scraps we managed to gather 
along the way. We stutter. We invent fiery language to 
do justice to the fire. It is madness, this language. 
It was madness in the first place, though. For we saw 
a fire that did not work properly, it expended no en-
ergy, and came with a voice. Our voice cannot copy 
this other voice, for this other voice was not of this 
world.
So we stammer, and speak sideways, and say art 
when we mean fire, and fire when what we really 
wanted to say was art.
Consider the burning bush. You can either go on 
and on about it, or stammer. Anyway, it provokes a 
disease called interpretation, of which we all suffer. 
Moses tried to kill off this disease, to cut it by the 
root, with the Ten Commandments, but it was much 
too late for any of that.
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In Moses the figures of the artist, the spectator and 
the interpreter are gathered, yet meaning was already 
obscured. Moses was the medium of God, and the 
word medium is meant both as thing and as person. 
Now we have split the work of art into three mo-
ments, and each of these three moments has a spe-
cific crisis. Production, fruition and critique all have 
crisis embedded in them, for in the presence of a fire 
we are left with nothing but stammering. The work 
of art is this three-legged stool – perfectly balanced 
yet not exactly built for strenuous use. It’s not even 
an object of contemplation, but more exactly a test. A 
test so that God can watch us fail.
Moses fails many times in the bible yet we only 
remember the plagues and the parting sea. Moses re-
turns to a people with nothing more than desert dust 
and stammers. Maybe he scribbled the Ten Com-
mandments on his way back, pausing in the distance 
and not wanting to be ridiculed. They are worshiping 
things, let me give them something to hold on to. A 
press release.
The figure of the prophet is much maligned, and 
rightly so. For the prophet has to choose between 
incomprehension and lie. Usually, and unlike Philip 
Guston, the prophet chooses and wants to be right. 
The artist shouldn’t want to be right, Guston said. 
And indeed, a conquering spirit will get you some-
where, but won’t help you when you want to get out 
of that somewhere. Prophet artists lack the basic 
skill to leave everything behind and follow art. Let us 
prefer the crisis artists, the stammering ones. Let us 
prefer the weak.
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After the death of the sun nothing will have hap-
pened. Not even God will have happened. All else 
is pathetic hope, risible hope, the hope of the con-
demned, Sisyphean hope, sissy hope, weak hope. The 
alternatives to weak hope seem even worse, for they 
laugh in the face of weakness and pretend that all is 
fine in condemnation. Well all is not fine.
Meaningless is a song by the Magnetic Fields that 
I have listened to in a loop for ten years, for some 
obscure reason. The obscurity of the reason might 
have nothing to do with the soiled comfort you find 
in depression. Maybe it has to do with mortality, 
and how often we don’t even remember that we have 
forgotten about it. One has to keep a song playing 
so everything else falls into place. Then, when you 
encounter a beautiful dead bird, you can actually see 
beyond the horror.
What if intrusive mice chew up your bed, and you 
call on God, and God is dead? Bonnie Prince Billy 
says that love comes to you, and this might be true. 
Not in spite of God being dead, but because there 
is almost no God left, so love can pour down from 
wherever it comes from.
There is no difference in Portuguese between sky and 
heaven, there are no subtleties there. You go to the 
sky, my grandmother said, until the very last mo-
ment, in which, after a whole life of prayer, regular 
confessions, and rigorous mass attendance, she no 
longer knew. We just don’t know, do we? – she said 
to me on her deathbed. It was the only moment, in 
my life, in which I felt God’s presence. Because God, 
in her, had retreated from a position of certainty, it 
left space for something else. I understood physically 
what Simone Weil meant by atheism as purification. 
Now it’s not a revelation I can talk about, for my 
gospel is risible. The revelation didn’t strengthen my 
faith, it made room for it, and the room is still mi-
nuscule.
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My grandmother didn’t understand all that fuss about 
Picasso. She preferred more realistic things. With age, I 
tend to agree, even if my own version of realism would 
have disturbed her greatly. It was all that nasty Rus-
sian literature she was always warning myself against. 
She understood very little about religion, my grand-
mother. Hers was the practice. I understood from 
her that faith was inscrutable but contagious – it was 
not a matter of fact but of something else. She would 
have understood Wittgenstein’s assertion that when 
your own house is on fire it is more reasonable to 
pray than to sweep the floor. Faith is a practical affair. 
You have specific saints to call on, even for when you 
can’t find your glasses. You can even recommend it 
to a child, with a large pinch of salt. My grandmother 
understood very little about the Old Testament, as 
it all looked brutal to her. Even the psalms felt for-
eign, even the eroticism of the Song of Solomon. It is 
more reasonable to pray if your own house is on fire 
and you have no means to put it out. It is a language 
game like all other articulations of speech, even if it 
is nothing else than delayed hesitation, stammering, 
pause in the face of fire. Let us go, my grandmoth-
er said before she died. I guess she did not want to 
make that leap alone. Let us go. Maybe there was a 
lesson there, that we need communality in death.
How can nihilistic intellectual maturity be recon-
ciled with faith? It seems that nihilism is already in 
tune with faith. Yet we have to imagine another nihil-
ism and another faith – a nihilism and a faith from 
the inside. Nihilism isn’t the source of all evils, nor 
is faith a sturdy defence against nothingness. They 
are both weak voices and share a vertical, calm ap-
proach to the advent of nothing. They both can 
happen in place of hope and in the place of hope. 
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Weak hope can stare at extinction as it can stare at 
anything else. The monochrome, in this circum-
stance, is there in place of the sacred image. The 
monochrome predicts the extinction of all images, 
their amalgamation and disposable nature. In this 
sense, Tristram Shandy’s black page represents not 
only the advent of modernity but its ending – it 
reveals the modern project for what it is, a concern 
with the end of things.
The modern project is inherently eschatological, for 
it dwells in the end of time and the limits brought 
about by the notion of the end of time. The modern 
project is in constant revision for the end of time is 
always being delayed, hence the obsession with con-
stant renaming and constant self-definition. In the 
same manner, Christian times are always apocalyptic, 
and can be best described as waiting time. Waiting 
for God, glory, and disaster. Disaster is what keeps 
the world afloat in endless self-becoming. Glory is 
what you see if you really open your eyes. Waiting for 
God is our condition, and is composed of millions of 
tiny sacrifices.
Sacrifice is one of the secrets of capital. Capital is a 
spiritual endeavour, an abstracted form of sacrifice. 
We sacrifice our time, our patience, our hopes and 
ambitions, for the sake of capital and for the sake of 
our children. Capital is our fatherland. We accept its 
twisted logic and its ecosystem. We sacrifice what-
ever was meant by the human.
Sacrifice is more foreign to us than any Star Trek 
religion, because we are unwittingly immersed in it. 
Maybe what God really meant with the Burning Bush 
was to point beyond sacrifice, towards a relationship 
without energy expenditure or profit.
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Sacrifice is at the very origin of our current contempt 
for religion. Sacrifice is disgusting, distasteful, like 
when British expats build a house in a cheap country 
and watch in horror when a chicken is slain on top 
of the first stone. Sacrifice is horror because we have 
nothing but sacrifice all around us, through capital-
ism, meat and death, and we refuse to acknowledge 
its brutal logic of substitution.
The privatisation of sacrifice is the story of the bible. 
Containment, introversion, substitution of substitu-
tion – this is perhaps a way to make a narrative out 
of all our sacred books. The first crime occurs instead 
of sacrifice, by a farmer who does not know how to 
channel violence and envy. Envy is perhaps the most 
obscure, obstructed thing in the universe (we always 
attribute it to others, as if there was a deep black spot 
at the heart of our souls). The farmer who slaugh-
ters his own brother is Cain, and Cain announces at 
once the need for sacrifice and the need to transcend 
sacrifice.
The martyr is perhaps the most problematic inven-
tion in the history of religion, for his status is forever 
linked to trauma’s indestructible knot. If the martyr 
kills as well as dies, he eludes classification and re-
mains unknowable.
Suicide bombers and other mass murderers play 
on our deep-rooted respect for what is erroneously 
called the ultimate sacrifice. This is why it is so dif-
ficult to talk about Bas Jan Ader. Behind the accident 
there lies a massive monster lurking, which we have 
called the martyr’s cloak. Suicide bombers, Dom 
Sebastião, Ader – we pause before them in respect, as 
if they held some kind of sacred fire. 
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And yet the fire of art is elsewhere. Diogenes’ lamp is 
perhaps a good image to talk about this fire. It is lit 
in broad daylight, and is looking for an honest man. 
Diogenes is a beggar, a failed Socrates, a good for 
nothing bum. He haunts the marketplace, where he 
joins the dogs in looking for scraps. And yet he can 
point elsewhere, to this fire that looks for honesty. 
What is this honesty but the willingness to become 
attentive?
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